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ABSTRACT
Weihang, Wang PhD, Purdue University, August 2018. Program Transformation for Secure
and Sustainable Web Applications. Major Professors: Xiangyu Zhang, Patrick Eugster.
Web advertising is a multi-billion-dollar industry. As a primary source of income for
many Internet companies, web advertising (ads) has a profound impact on the security and
sustainability of today’s web ecosystem. Web advertising, however, is extremely complex
and highly vulnerable to attacks. In fact, attackers using the web advertising system as
a channel to spread malware has become some of today’s largest web-based attacks. To
protect users from malicious advertising, we develop a memory randomization system,
PAD, that effectively prevents malicious advertising (malvertising) attacks exploiting zeroday vulnerabilities.
To reduce the risk of malicious ads and remove unwanted ads, recent studies show a
rapidly increasing number of web users are using ad blockers to block online advertisements. In the long run, blocking ads will devastate the entire web ecosystem by destroying
the business model on which many Internet companies rely. To support a sustainable web
ecosystem, we develop WebRanz, a web page randomization technique for circumventing
ad blocking software to retain publishers’ ad revenue. WebRanz is able to circumvent the
state-of-the-art ad blockers on a large number of popular websites while faithfully retaining
the appearances and functionalities of these websites.
In addition, modern browsers have a highly concurrent page rendering process in order
to be more responsive. Such concurrent execution models frequently lead to web concurrency bugs. These bugs can cause severe problems including permanent data corruption on
servers, denial of service, privilege escalation, etc. To solve the various concurrency issues
on the web, we introduce an innovative scheme, ARROW, that leverages constraint-solving
to ﬁx real-world concurrency bugs in a safe and cost-effective fashion.

1

1

INTRODUCTION

As a primary source of income for many Internet companies, web advertising (ads) has a
profound impact on the security and sustainability of today’s web ecosystem. In the current online advertising delivery, an ad slot on a publishers website may go through multiple
layers of ad networks until the ﬁnal ad content is delivered. These networks are physically scattered across the globe, and anyone – including cybercriminals – can sign up with.
However, instead of displaying ads, cybercriminals deliver malicious payloads to website
visitors which exploit vulnerabilities in browsers or browser plug-ins. Once malicious ads
inﬁltrate a visitor’s browser, the malware hidden within these ads can execute a number
of harmful attacks including dropping ransomware, spyware, or anything that beneﬁts the
attackers with little to no user interaction required. To reach a wide range of visitors,
malicious advertising (malvertising) attacks purposefully target legitimate websites with
high trafﬁc. A massive malvertising attack named AdGholas spotted in 2016 compromised
high-proﬁle sites, including msn.com, exposing 43 million visitors to malware within just
24 hours [1]. According to a report issued by Ernst & Young in 2015, the damage caused
by malvertising is striking: each year, the U.S. web advertising industry loses $1.1 billion
to malvertising [2].
Needless to say, concerns over malvertising are driving visitors to seek shelter behind
the wall of ad blocking software which blocks ads based on pre-deﬁned signatures. As a
temporary remedy for the scourge of malvertising, ad blockers, unfortunately, are only able
to prevent malicious ads where damage has already occurred. Additionally, in the long
run blocking ads will devastate the entire web ecosystem by destroying the business model
many Internet companies rely on and depriving publishers of vital ad revenue. Without
the monetary revenue gained from ads, various web companies would go out of business,
which is to no one’s beneﬁt. A survey by PageFair, an ad blocking measurement company,
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suggests that the estimated loss of global revenue due to blocked advertising during 2015
was $21.8 billion. This number rose to 41.4 billion in 2016 [3].
To satisfy increasingly complex functional requirements and provide highly responsive user experience, web pages are rendered concurrently. In such a concurrent execution
model, some execution orders may be signiﬁcantly different from the developer’s intention. In particular, when a web page is rendered, some of the included external resources
are downloaded, assembled and rendered asynchronously; due to various factors such as
network delay, user input events and internal events may ﬁre in a non-deterministic order.
These races are wide-spread and can cause serious problems. According to [4], developers in Mozilla have observed that many web sites used in their regression suite failed
non-deterministically due to races. They crashed the JS engine, caused session data loss,
or corrupted services such as the Hotmail email service. Some client side races may lead
to permanent data corruption on the server side such as online photos being undesirably
deleted.

1.1

Thesis Statement
To support secure and sustainable web applications, this dissertation develops program

analysis and transformation techniques to address three important issues on the web: protection against malicious advertising, defense against ad blocking, repair of web application
races.
In particular, we propose a novel programming support system for publisher developers
to program their regulation logic on ads. We develop an effective technique, called PAD,
for malicious ads prevention via JavaScript memory randomization. To recover the revenue loss from ad blocking software, we introduce a randomization mechanism, WebRanz,
to circumvent ad blocking on web pages without affecting the visual appearances and functionalities. We further propose ARROW, a static technique that can automatically, safely,
and cost effectively patch certain race issues on client side pages.

3
1.2

Contributions
This dissertation makes the following contributions:
• We propose a novel programming support system, PAD, that allows publishers to
program their protection logic of secure advertising. Due to the unique virtualized
execution model of web browsers, cybercriminals have to inject malicious payloads
via JavaScript interfaces that can manipulate consecutive memory regions. To corrupt
malicious payloads and thus neutralize attacks, PAD randomizes values in memory.
In particular, PAD encodes values written to memory and decodes them upon retrieval using the same key employed in encoding. In this way, malicious payloads are
encoded before being injected into memory. Since malicious payloads are always executed natively, without going through the JavaScript interfaces, malicious payloads
are not properly decoded before execution and hence broken. In contrast, benign
data used inside JavaScript is decoded properly as it has to go through the JavaScript
interfaces. PAD provides a novel persistent runtime, which can self-install in each
delegation layer and ensures persistent protection throughout the entire life-cycle of
ad delivery. With a negligible runtime overhead (1.67%) on 200 Alexa websites,
PAD effectively prevented a large set of real incidents of malvertising attacks.
• We develop a novel, lightweight web page randomization technique WebRanz that

circumvents ad blocking using a content (including HTML, CSS, and JavaScript)
randomization technique. Particularly, WebRanz randomizes page elements’ signatures such as URL, id, and classname to invalidate the predeﬁned patterns that ad

blockers use to ﬁlter out ads, and de-randomizes elements when they are accessed
through interface functions. To ensure page appearances and legitimate functionalities are intact, WebRanz was designed to preserve the dependencies between DOM
objects and CSS selectors, between DOM elements and JavaScript, and to be able to
handle dynamically generated elements as well as resolve randomized URLs. WebRanz effectively prevents ad blockers from blocking ads on 221 Alexa top web
pages. It has a negligible runtime overhead (1.38%) which does not downgrade user
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experience. Finally, WebRanz also beneﬁts the defense against web bots that rely
on predeﬁned patterns to locate DOM elements. Our experiments showed that WebRanz successfully prevented representative web bots targeted at popular websites
including Amazon, Groupon, Twitter, and Yelp.
• We propose ARROW, a static technique that can automatically, safely, and cost effectively patch certain race issues on client side pages. To achieve three challenging goals: (1) ﬁxes do not break any existing semantics (and hence introduce new
bugs); (2) ﬁxes do not interfere in ways leading to any undesirable consequences;
(3) and the overall repair plan is cost-effective, ARROW models the problem of
automatically ﬁxing multiple races in a web page together as a constraint solving
problem. In particular, ARROW statically models a web page as a causal graph denoting happens-before relations between elements. ARROW then detects races by
identifying inconsistencies between the graph and the dependence relations intended
by the developer. To ensure consistencies, ARROW leverages a constraint solver to
compute additional happens-before edges. The page is then transformed to ensure
the new happens-before relation by re-ordering the elements in the page or adding
customized synchronizations to respect the repair edges. ARROW effectively ﬁxed
151 races from 20 real-world commercial websites.

1.3

Dissertation Organization
This dissertation is organized as follows: chapter 2 discusses PAD which allows pub-

lisher developers to program their regulation logic on ads and effectively suppresses a large
set of real-world malvertising cases that infected high proﬁle websites. Chapter 3 discusses
WebRanz which randomizes web pages so that the content of the randomized web pages
can be protected and preserved from ad blockers and web bots. Chapter 4 discusses the
design and implementation of ARROW which automatically repairs web races, without
introducing new bugs, in a cost-effective way. Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation.
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2

PAD: PROGRAMMING THIRD-PARTY WEB ADVERTISEMENT
CENSORSHIP

In the current online advertisement delivery, an ad slot on a publisher’s website may go
through multiple layers of bidding and reselling until the ﬁnal ad content is delivered. The
publishers have little control on the ads being displayed on their web pages. As a result,
website visitors may suffer from unwanted ads such as malvertising, intrusive ads, and information disclosure ads. Unfortunately, the visitors often blame the publisher for their unpleasant experience and switch to competitor websites. In this chapter, we propose a novel
programming support system for ad delivery, called PAD, for publisher programmers, who
specify their policies on regulating third-party ads shown on their websites. PAD features
an expressive speciﬁcation language and a novel persistent policy enforcement runtime
that can self-install and self-protect throughout the entire ad delegation chain. It also provides an ad-speciﬁc memory protection scheme that prevents malvertising by corrupting
malicious payloads. Our experiments show that PAD has negligible runtime overhead. It
effectively suppresses a set of malvertising cases and unwanted ad behaviors reported in
the real world, without affecting normal functionalities and regular ads.

2.1

Introduction
Web advertisements (ads) are probably the most ubiquitous mashups nowadays and are

still growing substantially. The annual revenue of US online advertising increased from
12.5 billion (2005) to 59.6 billion (2015), demonstrating a stunning 17% compound annual
growth [5]. They are the main source of income for many Internet companies (e.g. Google
and Facebook) and nourish various online services (e.g., news and social networks). Web
ads have been widely deployed on most high-trafﬁc websites. In 2017, more than 1.97
million popular websites participate in advertising campaigns [6].
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Figure 2.1.: Ad network system.

Under the hood, a gigantic digital advertising system connects various parties and fulﬁlls the complicated transactions among them. Websites join the ecosystem as publishers.
They offer pre-allocated slots to ad networks and deliver bootstrapping JavaScript libraries
hosted by the network to visitors. These ad loading snippets are executed in visitor’s
browser. They collect and send the visitor/website proﬁles to the ad exchange. This information is further shared with participating advertisers/networks before the ad exchange
conducts a pay-per-impression auction. Advertisers evaluate its value based on the proﬁles
and bid for a particular impression. Finally, additional JavaScript snippets are returned to
the visitor and eventually load the actual ad content (e.g. Adobe Flashes, videos, images or
texts) from the auction winner.
However, the impedance mismatch between mashup software devOps and software engineering [7] has already resulted in several challenging issues. The nature of dynamically
including source-code from all over the world makes the traditional software engineering
(e.g. modularity and security guidelines) less applicable. In the context of web ads, although the ad exchange and impression bidding approach greatly improves the efﬁciency
of the advertising business, it brings risks to publishers because websites don’t know the
auction winners. They have to blindly trust and deliver any contents from the ad networks
to their visitors without any control.
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Undesired Ads. Even though reputable ad networks ﬁlter malformed ads, visitors still receive undesired ads that cause negative user experience or even endanger visitors’ systems.
Such obnoxious practices easily alienate visitors and irreparably damage websites’ reputations [8]. Besides, a recent study [9] shows that while undesired ads can bring in 0.10-0.80
USD, they cost publishers 1.53 USD per thousand impressions, meaning that websites are
actually losing money by running such bad ads. To make things even worse, attackers are
gaming the system and using this channel to spread malware. As shown in Fig. 2.1, attackers join the network and act as normal advertisers. However, instead of sending ads, they
trick the network and attempt to deliver malicious code to the website visitors. Exploiting
the open nature of ad network, attackers can even bid for high-value targets based on their
operating systems, browser versions, country locations and other identifying features. By
paying a small amount of money, attackers can easily “select” the right type of targets from
a huge number of Internet users all over the world.
Malvertising campaigns are becoming a prominent threat. According to Cyphort Labs,
“by 2013 malvertising increased to over 209, 000 incidents and generated over 12.4 billion malicious ad impressions, which is more than four per each person using the Internet”. During 2014, a 325% increase in malvertising attacks has been observed [10]. In
addition, it’s believed that leveraging zero-day exploits has made malvertising more effective. In March 2016, visitors of the NY Times, the BBC, Newsweek, The Hill, MSN.com,
Aol.com, the Weather Network, the HNL, and Realtor.com have seen ads trying to install
malicious ransomware and Trojans. These popular websites have billions of visitors every
month [11]. “The websites themselves weren’t compromised. The problem was that the ad
networks these sites use - Google, AppNexus, AOL, Rubicon - were tricked into serving the
malicious ads, which would lead users to sites hosting an exploit kit” [12]. The exploit kit
then attempts to leverage browser vulnerabilities, penetrate the sandbox and get into the
target’s computer.
In response to the chaos, ad blocking software are widely used by website visitors.
According to a survey by PageFair, an anti-adblocking authority, over 600 million devices
run ad blocking software globally in 2016 [13]. Although ad blockers can mitigate some of
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the problems caused by third party ads, in the long run simply blocking ads will devastate
the economic structure underlying the Internet. Without the monetary revenue gained from
ads, various web services would go out of business, which is to no one’s beneﬁt. As such,
ad blocking is not a desirable solution to the problem.
Our approach. In this chapter, we propose PAD, a novel technique that allows publishers
to program their policies to regulate ads rendered on their websites. Such regulations aim to
protect website visitors from undesired ad related behaviors such as malvertising or intrusive ads, and protect publishers from detrimental client-side behaviors such as ad blocking.
The protection is enforced during the entire life-cycle of the ad delivery, disregarding layers
of reselling and delegation.
PAD allows publisher programmers to compose their regulation logic using an expressive language. It further compiles policies to JavaScript (JS) code that executes on a novel
persistent runtime, which can self-install in each delegation layer and execute preemptively
before any third-party script. The runtime also features a novel memory randomization
mechanism that protects memory accesses to block malware at the entry points. PAD can
be conﬁgured to disable certain regular JS functionalities (e.g., pop-ups) based on the runtime context (e.g., the advertiser’s domain). PAD integrates the recent advances in web
page randomization [14] to allow the publishers to randomize speciﬁed ad content, instead
of the entire web page as in [14], to circumvent ad blocking software.
In summary, we make the following contributions.
• We propose the novel idea of allowing publishers to program their regulation of ads
displayed on their websites.

• We develop a simple yet expressive language to program regulation policies. Policies are
transparently compiled to JS code that enforces the regulation.

• We develop a novel subversion-resilient runtime system that ensures persistent regulations throughout the entire life-cycle of ad delivery and features a novel memory protection technique to prevent malvertising.
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• Our evaluation on Alexa Top 200 Global Sites shows that PAD has reasonable overhead
and does not affect normal contents. It successfully prevents a large set of real incidents
of malvertising and undesired ads we have reproduced.

2.2

Motivation
In this section, we illustrate undesired ads by examples and motivate our approach.

2.2.1

Malvertising

Like normal advertisers, attackers can also participate in the impression bidding. However, instead of delivering ads, they distribute malware. When a website visitor satisﬁes
the conditions (geographic location, browser versions, etc.), she will receive the malicious
code via the ad network. To ﬂy under the radar, such code usually runs various checks
on the execution context (e.g. existences of debuggers and vulnerable components) before
attempting to infect the victim.
Recently, a sophisticated campaign named AdGholas was reported [1]. According to
a cybersecurity company Proofpoint [15], the attackers used 22 ad networks to distribute
malicious code. It affected 113 legitimate sites including The New York Times, Le Figaro,
The Verge, PCMag, IBTimes, ArsTechnica, Daily Mail, Telegraaf, La Gazetta dello Sport,
CBS Sports, Top Gear, Urban Dictionary, Playboy, Answers.com, Sky.com, etc. It was
highly effective and infected thousands of victims per day. Depending on locations, different malwares were delivered and installed on victim’s computer. Gozi (targeting at Internet
Solutions for Business) was dropped in Canada, Terdot.A (aka DELoader) in Australia,
Godzilla loaded Terdot.A in UK, and Gootkit in Spain.
These malware have caused massive damages. For example, the banking Trojan Gozi
steals banking information to automate the procedure of robbing online banking customers.
According to the indictment by the US Department of Justice [16], Gozi alone infected
more than 1 million computers and caused tens of millions of dollars in losses. When an
infected visitor logs into the online banking system, the Trojan injects form ﬁelds (e.g.,

10

Figure 2.2.: Gozi injects forms to steal sensitive ﬁnancial information [15].

Fig. 2.2) that request additional information. These sensitive ﬁnancial data will be sent
to the attackers. Gozi also allows attackers to spoof the victim’s bank balance. After
transferring all available money , Gozi forces the victim’s browser to display the original
balance before the robbery [15].
Now, let’s inspect how the AdGholas campaign can effectively infect so many victims
without being caught for such a long time. Fig. 2.3 shows the key steps, which involve
multiple parties, redirections and anti-monitoring checks. The standard ad network bidding
details are omitted.
After receiving the “sniffering” scripts from the ad network, visitors are proﬁled and
ﬁltered by a third-party website browser-defence.com. If they are from the targeted regions,
they will get a banner with malicious code.
The next step is critical for evasion. AdGholas checks the client-side environment and
makes sure it’s not being monitored. This is done by executing a JS snippet using the
Internet Explorer vulnerability CVE-2016-0162. However, AdGholas follows a special
and innovative design. Instead of retrieving the code explicitly, it hides this malicious
script using steganography techniques. In particular, this JS snippet is encoded in the alpha
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Figure 2.3.: AdGholas campaign (Dec. 2016) [1].

channel of the banner image, which deﬁnes the transparency of each pixel. Then, The JS
snippet is decoded from the image and reconstructed on the ﬂy.
If monitoring utilities such as anti-virus software are not detected, the visitor will be
silently redirected to the landing page of the real exploit kit. The kit is designed to target
speciﬁc versions of the Flash players. If present, the exploited Flash player will download binary executables of backdoors, spyware or trojans and execute them without user
consents.
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2.2.2

Annoying Ads

Besides malvertising, some ads are not deliberately harmful. However, they may blink,
ﬂoat around, pop open a new window or automatically play sounds, which are irritating.
HubSpot Research conducted a survey on annoying ads [8]. They interviewed 1, 055 Internet users in the US, UK, Germany and France in 2016, and found that pop-ups and video
ads are the most undesired ads. 83% agree that some ads should be disallowed. 85% say
obnoxious ads damage publisher’s reputation and should be ﬁltered out.
There are already efforts [17–20] on detecting undesired ads based on the observed
behaviors. ad blockers powered by predeﬁned blacklists are widely used. But they are
not sufﬁcient as they cannot suppress malvertising until their patterns are discovered and
modeled. Instead, we argue that allowing publishers to persistently regulate third-party
contents is a better solution. Particularly, publishers may specify regulations for an ad slot,
which will be enforced for all transactions and delegations introduced by the ad slot.
Fig. 2.4(a) shows a sample policy supported by PAD for the ad tag ad btf. It disallows
any ad with sound after the delegation chain becomes longer than 3 steps (we assume the
top-level ads vendors deliver multimedia ads properly). Fig. 2.4(b) shows the ads without
PAD, where sound related resources are highlighted by 1 . Fig. 2.4(c) shows the ads loaded
with PAD enabled, where sound related tags are removed.

(a) Enforcing Policy Rule with PAD
<pad> if (depth > 3) then block SOUND </pad>

(b) Ad playing noisy sound

(c) Ad without noisy sound

<html>...
<div id="ad_btf" ...>
<iframe ...><iframe ...><iframe ...>
<audio autoplay="autoplay"> 1
<source src="macalert.mp3"
type="audio/mpeg">
</audio> ...
</iframe></iframe></iframe>
</div>...</html>

<html>...
<div id="ad_btf" ...>
<iframe ...><iframe ...><iframe ...>
<!-2
<audio> tag is removed
<source> tag is removed
-->
</iframe></iframe></iframe>
</div>...</html>

Figure 2.4.: Preventing ads playing sound.
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2.3
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Figure 2.5.: Overview.

The current ads system has a very open policy: anyone can bid for (and win) an ad slot
and can resell the slot to other parties. The current system is fundamentally vulnerable to
malicious/undesired ads that are intentionally or unintentionally delivered by bidders. We
study and classify the commonly seen undesired ad behaviors in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1.: Commonly seen undesired ad behaviors.
Category (Type)
Malvertising (U1)
Intrusive Ads (U2)
Information
Disclosure (U3)
Inappropriate ads (U4)
Nontransparent
ads (U5)
Ad blocking (U6)

Description/Examples
Delivering malicious software via ads
Disrupt navigation behavior (e.g., popup)
Access private information for tracking
Fingerprinting browser/system versions
Ads with inappropriate contents (e.g., violence)
Ads with encrypted/encoded ﬂashes
Ads delivered through HTTP
Blocking legitimate ads

Malvertising uses ad networks to deliver malicious software. Intrusive ads distract visitors and cause unpleasant experience. For example, some ads intentionally divert users’
attention with audio or video. Information disclosure in ad delivery leaks sensitive user
information. Third party ads often contain JS code that collects information on the client
side and sends them back to the advertisers. In many cases, sensitive information is collected, causing privacy concerns. For example, user browsing history is often collected to
retarget ads. However, exposing such history to nonreputable advertisers should be regulated. Examples of inappropriate ads include videos of violence for kids and ads from

14
the publisher’s competitors (which should not be displayed on the publisher’s web page).
Although ad networks have rules to prevent inappropriate ad contents, these rules are usually too general and context-insensitive. Nontransparent ads use stealthy techniques for
disguising themselves or preventing inspection. For example, a malicious ad may dynamically construct a (malicious) ﬂash to avoid being detected. Ad blocking removes ads from
web pages. While undesired ads are suppressed, ad-blockers also block legitimate ads,
eventually damaging the ecosystem.
While ad networks strive to suppress undesired ads, they usually lack the necessary
context to perform the needed ﬁne-grained regulation. For example, they may not have
enough information about the publisher site to determine what ads are deemed inappropriate. They also lack the resources and mechanism to regulate the huge volume of ads. Note
that after bidding, ads are often loaded directly from the advertisers’ servers to the client,
without going through the ad networks. We consider publishers to be the ideal party to
regulate unwanted ads and third-party contents because they have the comprehensive contexts. They also have a strong incentive to deliver relevant ads to the right consumers. In
addition, comparing to having centralized censorship on ad networks, it is more scalable to
do so on the individual client machines.
Therefore, our problem statement is to allow publisher developers to program their
regulation of third party ads shown on their pages in a reliable and persistent fashion.

2.4

Overview
We propose a novel programming support system for third party ad censorship called

PAD. As shown in Fig. 3.9, PAD consists of three main components: the policy speciﬁcation language, the policy compiler that compiles speciﬁcation to JS code, and a runtime
that facilitates regulations.
Policy Speciﬁcation Language.

PAD provides a language for publisher developers to

program their ad censorship. The developers engineer their regulation logic within an ad
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tag in the publisher’s content page using our language. Such tags indicate the locations of
ads, which are populated when the content page is loaded.
Policy Compiler.

The policy compiler compiles censorship policies in a content page

to the corresponding JS code. Only compiled pages are deployed. Each ad tag has its
independent policy code. In other words, censorship is ad tag speciﬁc. This is because
individual tags independently load ads from different sources at runtime, requiring different
regulations. Programming global censorship (for an entire page or publisher domain) is
possible but we leave it to our future work.
PAD Runtime. PAD runtime consists of 4 modules: Automated Runtime Installer (ARI)
(§2.5.3), Memory Protection (§2.5.3), Access Control (§2.5.3) and Randomization (§2.5.3).
They are essentially JS code that is shipped to the client.
• Automated Runtime Installer (ARI). ARI is the core engine enforcing the regulating
code in all delegation layers. For multi-layer ad networks, PAD monitors dynamically
generated contents and propagates itself into the next layer.
• Memory Protection. Based on our extensive study on malvertising campaigns in the

wild, we observe that the manipulation of consecutive memory regions in JS or ActionScript is the root cause of payload injection. To mitigate malvertising attacks, PAD
prevents payload injection by perturbing values in consecutive memory regions.

• Access Control. This module allows publishers to restrict undesired ads such as infor-

mation leak ads and intrusive ads. The module essentially intercepts and/or masks some

JS APIs that are critical for undesired ads.
• Randomization. To circumvent client-side ad blockers, our runtime leverages an existing web page randomization technique WebRanz [14] to bypass ad blockers’ blacklist.

2.5

Design
In this section, we present the design of PAD. We describe each component in detail

and reason about our design choices.
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2.5.1

Policy Speciﬁcations
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sb j ::= MEMORY | FLASH
ca ::= GEO-DATA | COOKIE | BROWSER-VERSION |
FLASH-PLAYER-VERSION | EMBEDDED-FLASH |
LOADING | MIMETYPE | POPUP | SOUND |
SRCLESS-IFRAME | REDIRECTION
a ::= CANVAS-DATA | DOM
c ::= {0, 1, 2, ...}
curUrl, u

Figure 2.6.: Language.

The policy speciﬁcation language is presented in Fig. 2.6. The language supports a
few statements that specify the actions for undesired ad behaviors, for example, protect
memory, block clients’ cookies or geo-location data from being accessed by ad scripts,
and randomize DOM to circumvent ad blockers. The language also supports conditional
branches to allow publishers to specify the conditions in which the above-mentioned actions should be taken. For example, a publisher may wish to apply memory protection for
certain ad networks by comparing the current domain (curUrl) with some domain u speciﬁed by the publisher. We also support comparison of delegation history, which records the
entire ad delegation/reselling history. Such history is quite useful. For example, a cyclic
delegation chain (i.e., an ad dealer sells an ad slot and later buys it back) may suggest abnormal behavior. Therefore, the current domain, the delegation depth, and the delegation
history are of special interest and explicitly modeled in the language. Publisher developers
can use regular JS together with our language to achieve maximum feasibility.

2.5.2

Policy Compiler

Given a content page with policy specs, PAD parses the page to a DOM tree using
htmlparser2. It ﬁrst adds the automated runtime installer at the beginning of the page to
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<pad>
if (curUrl != "doubleClick.com") then
block BROWSER-VERSION
</pad>
...
<div id = "google_ads"></div>

Figure 2.7.: Publisher page code with policy speciﬁcation.
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<script>
ARI({"google_ads"});
</script>
<div id = "google_ads">
<script>
if (curUrl != "doubleClick.com") {
Object.defineProperty(window, "navigator", {
get: function() {
return null;
}
});
}
</script>
...
</div>

Figure 2.8.: Publisher page with compiled policy code.

make sure it gets executed before any other elements are loaded. It then traverses the tree
to identify all ad tags and the corresponding policy specs. The JS statements in the specs
are simply copied to the output page whereas the statements in our language are translated
to the corresponding JS code to fulﬁll the speciﬁc actions, including updating critical state
variables (e.g., delegation depth) and invoking API functions provided by our runtime. The
details are elided.
Fig. 2.7 and Fig. 2.8 illustrate how the policy compiler compiles a program with access
control specs. In Fig. 2.7, the publisher includes an ad (with id of “google ads”) at line
6 and inserts a spec at lines 2-3 to block browser versions from being ﬁngerprinted. In
Fig. 2.8, the compiled policy code is inserted at lines 6-12. The compiled code redeﬁnes
window.navigator and changes its getter to returning null when a read attempt is executed. The code at lines 6-12 is only effective at the current layer of ad delegation. To
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propagate the policy code when inner frames are created, the function ARI at line 2 invokes the automated runtime installer (ARI) to self-install the policy code along the entire
propagation chain. We will discuss the design of ARI in Sec. 2.5.3.

2.5.3

PAD Runtime

Automated Runtime Installer (ARI)
Algorithm 1 Automated Runtime Installer.
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INPUT : A compiled web app with instrumentation
guarding the 1st layer of each Ad
OUTPUT: Enforcing policy speciﬁcations over the entire
delegation chain during runtime
procedure ARI(ads)
for ad in ads do
depth
0
history 0/
globalVar
{depth, history}
policyCode getPolicyCode(ad)
if innerIframeCreated() then
propagate(policyCode, globalVar)
procedure PROPAGATE(policyCode,globalVar)
globalVar.depth globalVar.depth + 1
globalVar.history globalVar.history [ curUrl
inject(globalVar)
inject(policyCode)
if innerIframeCreated() then
propagate(policyCode, globalVar)

ARI provides persistent protection along the ad delegation chain. At each delegation layer,
new content (such as HTML/JS/Flash/inner frame) can be dynamically generated via JS
functions such as document.write(). ARI propagates PAD’s protection logic along the
delegation chain.
Alg. 1 describes the design of ARI. It takes a compiled publisher page with ads guarded
by instrumentation code. For each ad within the page, ARI initializes global variables such
as the delegation depth (line 3), domain history (line 4) and extracts the policy code
generated from compiler for each speciﬁcation (line 6). When an inner <iframe> is created, ARI invokes a recursive function propagate() to propagate the policy code and global
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variables to the next layer of delegation (lines 7-8). The recursive function propagate() increments the delegation depth (line 10) and updates the domain history to include the
current domain (line 11). Then it injects the updated global variables and policy code into
the current layer (lines 12-13). The recursive procedure continues to propagate if a next
layer of <iframe> is dynamically generated.

Webpage request

Publisher's Webpage
Ad request via JS libs

<iframe id="ad_creative..." ...>
<html><head><script src="PAD.js" ...>...
...
<script src="ad_content.js"></script>
...

document.write("<iframe ...>...");
Ad network

ARI rewrites document.write()

</html>
</iframe>

2
Ad request via JS libs
document.write("<iframe ...>...");

Advertiser

F1

<iframe id="google_ads_iframe_..." ...>
B
<html><head><script src="PAD.js" ...>...</head>

1
Publisher

<html><head><script src="PAD.js" ...>...</head>...
A
<div id="div-gtp-ad-..." ...>

ARI rewrites document.write()

3

C

F2
F3

Ad Content

</html>
</iframe>

</div>
...
</html>

Figure 2.9.: Recursively applied ARI on multiple delegations.

Fig. 2.9 depicts the code snippet of how ARI enforces PAD in the delegation layers.
The right side of Fig. 2.9 shows a webpage including dynamically generated ad content
during the ad delivery process. Note that in the example, the publisher already installed
PAD on their webpages by including <script src="PAD.js" ...> ( A in Fig. 2.9).
When a user visits the website, the web page with PAD is loaded ( 1 ). During the
page load, an ad request is initiated to ad networks to retrieve the ad contents (e.g., HTML,
JS, Flash). The ad contents are dynamically inserted into the webpage ( 2 ) by creating
an inner frame F2 . Note that the document.write() at 2 is executed within frame
F1 , where PAD is already installed. Hence, PAD intercepts it at 2 and inserts <script
src="PAD.js" ...> ( B ) to install itself within the new inner frame. Similarly, another
layer of delegation is dynamically inserted into the inner page F2 . At 3 , PAD inserts
<script src="PAD.js" ...> ( C ) to install itself into the new inner frame F3 , where
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the actual ad is ﬁnally delivered. Since PAD is propagated through delegations, it can
enforce the protections persistently.

Memory Protection
In this section, we ﬁrst analyze memory management related attack vectors in ads.
Then, we introduce our memory protection runtime support which mitigates malvertising
by corrupting malicious payloads.
Memory Management in Web Ads. As ads include JS/Flash contents, they can allocate
and access memory via JS or ActionScript (AS) interfaces. We ﬁrst explain different ways
of accessing memory and how malicious ads exploit them.

(a) An example of Array
1.
2.

var ary = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]; // initialize
ary[4] = 50; // change a value

[0] [1] [2] [3] [4]

(b) ary at Line 1:

(c) Memory:

(d) ary at Line 2:

1

2

3

4

5

... 50

[0] [1] [2] [3] [4]

Figure 2.10.: Immutable object.

• Immutable Objects. Immutable Objects are objects whose previously stored values on
the memory are not overwritten. Fig. 2.10(a) illustrates a simple JS/AS program that

initializes an array and updates its ﬁfth element. Fig. 2.10(b-c) show how the array
is allocated in the memory. Note that Array in JS is actually implemented as a hash
table and a set of pointers to elements. More importantly, it is immutable, meaning that
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changing a value in the array does not change the previously stored value. Instead, as
shown in Fig. 2.10(c), a new memory buffer is allocated for the new value.
• Mutable Objects (MO). Some JS and AS objects can access memory directly. We call
such objects mutable objects. Unlike immutable objects, mutable objects allow over-

writing previously stored values in memory. More importantly, the buffer allocated for
a mutable object is consecutive. TypedArray (e.g., Uint8Array, Uint16Array and
Uint32Array) and DataView in JS and ByteArray/Vector in AS are popular classes
that can create mutable objects. Besides, Canvas in JS and ImageData are used to access image data (e.g., pixel colors). They can create mutable objects too. Indeed, many
exploits leverage them to directly write consecutive memory by changing image data
(e.g., pixel colors in RGBA format).
• Consecutive Immutable Objects (CIO). We call multiple immutable objects that may

be allocated in consecutive memory consecutive immutable object. For example, in modern browsers (e.g., Firefox and Chrome), Array objects in JS are allocated in consecutive

buffers when they hold a primitive type (e.g., integer). String objects are also allocated
in consecutive buffers.
Attacks on Memory in Malvertising. We analyze popular malvertising campaigns and
exploit kits used in attacks and ﬁnd that most attacks exploit vulnerabilities in JS/AS memory management. In particular, they use mutable objects to inject and trigger malicious
payloads. In the following paragraphs, we explain details of such attacks and their root
causes.
• Payload Injection and Triggering via Mutable Objects. Mutable objects are widely

used to inject and trigger malicious payloads by overwriting critical values in memory
(e.g., return addresses). Speciﬁcally, upon the allocation of a mutable object, a new buffer
is allocated and the corresponding memory address and length are stored in memory.
When the mutable object is used, the address pointing to the start of the buffer is retrieved
in order to compute the address for the access. If the address or the length of the allocated

buffer is compromised, an attacker can access arbitrary memory just like accessing this
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mutable object. Such compromise is often achieved through vulnerabilities such as type
confusion [21].
• Payload Injection via CIO. As consecutive memory buffers are allocated for CIO, they
can be leveraged to inject payloads like heap spraying. However, immutable objects can-

not be directly used to write arbitrary memory and heap spraying itself does not trigger
the injected payload. Therefore, to launch an attack, the attacker must rely on another
vulnerability to trigger the injected code.
Algorithm 2 Memory protection via value randomization.
1
2
3
4
5
6

7
8
9
10
11

INPUT : A JS statement such as new Uint32Array([21, 3, 15])
OUTPUT: A Uint32Array object with value encoded
procedure OVERLOADED U INT 32A RRAY(values)
valuesInMemory Uint32Array(values.length)
for i = 0; i < values.length ; i++ do
valuesInMemory[i] encode(values[i])
this.values
Uint32Array(valuesInMemory)
return this
INPUT : A JS statement such as u32arr.indexOf(15)
OUTPUT: Return the index of “15” from [21, 3, 15]
procedure OVERLOADED INDEX O F(elem)
valuesInMemory
this.values
for i = 0; i < valuesInMemory.length ; i++ do
values[i] decode(valuesInMemory[i])
return this.indexOf(values)

Mitigating Malvertising via Memory Protection. We mitigate malvertising via memory
protection, which is driven by the procedure of attacks being launched using mutable objects and consecutive immutable objects. Malvertising attacks are conducted in two critical
steps. First, a malicious payload is injected into the victim’s memory via legitimate channels (e.g., loading an image with a payload prepared by an exploit kit), and heap spraying is
often used due to address space randomization techniques. Later, the payload is triggered
and executed by exploiting vulnerabilities. As these two steps are essential to its success,
malvertising can be suppressed by breaking either step. We describe how we achieve this
via value and data layout randomization.
• Value Randomization (Encoding/Decoding Values). PAD breaks a malicious payload
by perturbing values in memory. In particular, it encodes values written to memory via
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MO and CIO, and decodes them upon retrieval using the same key employed in encoding.
In this scenario, malicious payload is encoded before being injected to memory. However, since a malicious payload is always executed natively, without going through the
JS/AS interfaces, it is not properly decoded before execution and hence broken. Alg. 2
illustrates how value randomization is realized for Uint32Array objects. Speciﬁcally,
when a new Uint32Array object is created, instead of storing the arguments ([21, 3,
15]) as array values, the overloaded constructor (lines 1-6) encodes each element and
the encoded values are stored in memory. When the statement invokes indexOf(15)
on the previously created object, the Uint32Array.indexOf is overloaded (lines 7-11).
To return the index of element “15” (i.e., 2), the values in memory are decoded and the
native implementation of indexOf is invoked to return (lines 9-11).
• Data Layout Randomization. PAD also randomizes the underlying memory layout for

JS/AS objects to break a malicious payload, which is quite sensitive to memory structures. In fact, attackers leverage CIOs to inject payloads mainly because they provide
a convenient (and reliable) way to hold the carefully crafted payload in a consecutive
sequence of buffers. To randomize memory layout, when a new CIO is created, PAD creates new dummy objects and inserts them in between the original buffers. For instance,
when a program creates an array [1,2,3], PAD constructs [1,R,2,R,3] instead, where R represents a random value. As a result, if an attacker tries to inject malicious ROP payloads
with CIO, the random values placed between ROP gadgets will break the exploit. Note
that the semantics of the array is not broken as when the array is accessed, we translate

the index of the real values, skipping the inserted R.

Access Control
As discussed in Sec. 2.5.2, the policy compiler compiles the speciﬁcation program and
redeﬁnes objects such as window.navigator to block the access to particular objects and
achieve access control. During runtime, the redeﬁned getters will be invoked rather than the
native functions. For example, as illustrated in Fig. 2.8 (line 6-12), any read access to the
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browser information from domains other than doubleclick.com via window.navigator is
restricted. Security sensitive objects and objects related with intrusive ads are identiﬁed
and redeﬁned during runtime. We omit the discussion of other objects as they are similar
to above-mentioned case.

Randomization
WebRanz [14] is integrated into PAD. WebRanz is a web page randomization technique
which protects advertisements from being blocked by ad blockers. Speciﬁcally, it randomizes URLs and DOM element properties (e.g., id and name), which ad blockers rely on
to locate and remove ads. However, WebRanz is not sensitive to ad tags. Instead, its randomization technique is applied to the entire page, resulting in a high overhead. PAD only
performs randomization on ad contents within ad tags speciﬁed by publishers. By doing
so, publishers can deliver ads without being blocked by ad blockers with less overhead. As
the randomization technique is not our focus, details are omitted.

2.5.4

Threat Model

PAD assumes publishers and website visitors are benign, while the ad-networks and advertisers may be malicious. Note that, in most malvertising campaigns, the malicious party
is the advertiser. While the ad-networks might also be compromised, protecting compromised publishers is beyond the scope of our chapter. In fact, if a publisher is compromised,
any operation in the compromised page cannot be trusted. Similarly, protecting visitors
with compromised systems (e.g., OS/Kernel/Browser) is out of our scope.
Accessing Original Deﬁnitions. An attacker may try to bypass PAD by locating and directly using the original functions or classes. A straightforward way is scanning all variables to ﬁnd the ones holding the original versions. For example, window in JS can be used
to enumerate all deﬁned global variables. By recursively resolving the global variables, one
may gain access to any variable including the variables holding the original deﬁnitions. To
prevent this, we disable variable enumerations via Object.defineProperty() as a part
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of our runtime installer. Note that Object.defineProperty() is protected so an attacker
cannot abuse this interface. Moreover, even though it is not enumerable, if the variable
names are statically deﬁned, they can be directly accessed by names. Hence, we generate
random names for the variables that contain original deﬁnitions. The name is randomized
on each load to make it a moving target.
Removing Our Protection. An attacker may try to remove our protection by replacing
classes and methods overwritten by PAD with their own version. To prevent this, we use
defineProperty to make classes and methods we modiﬁed read-only. Speciﬁcally, we set
writable property to false and override defineProperty to prevent further changes.
As we do it at the very beginning of each delegation, no JS code including malicious one
can disable our deﬁnition.
Disabling Automated Runtime Installer. As PAD’s protection depends on ARI which
installs itself and PAD, an attacker may try to disable ARI. However, to achieve this, the
attacker needs to bypass our methods by calling the original ones which we made impossible as discussed above. In brief, one cannot remove our methods as they are read-only
(e.g., writable:

false). To prevent any attempts to change the writable property of

object, we override defineProperty to disallow change requests.

2.6

Evaluation
PAD is implemented in JavaScript and ActionScript, leveraging a set of Node.js utilities.

We investigated the following research questions to evaluate the effectiveness of PAD to
regulate third-party ads over the complex ads delegation process.
RQ1 How effective is PAD on preventing malvertising?
RQ2 How effective is PAD on preventing information leak ads, non-transparent ads, inappropriate and intrusive ads?
RQ3 How much runtime overhead does PAD incur?
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Table 2.2.: Characteristics of malicious ad campaigns.
Ad

Date

Publisher (Ad Networks)

First Ad Redirect

1*

17-01-14 [21]
N/A
N/A (PropellerAds, ClickAdu etc.)
16-12-06 [22]
Yahoo, MSN (N/A)
broxu.com
3
16-07-25 [23]
N/A (RevenueHits)
foundationarcet.org
4
16-07-05 [24]
N/A (RevenueHits)
top4download.org
*
16-05-25 [25] answers.com (DoubleClick, Zedo etc.)
rﬁhub.com
5
6
16-03-04 [26]
nalsee.com (N/A)
49.238.137.2
Japanese News Sites (N/A)
N/A
7* 15-09-30 [27]
8
14-11-11 [28]
wira-ku.com (N/A)
a.horsered.com
9
14-10-06 [29]
network-tools.com (N/A)
ox.help.org
10 14-09-29 [30]
hindustantimes.com (N/A)
static.rcs7.org
11 14-09-11 [31]
marica.bg (N/A)
serve.intelelink.net
12 14-09-05 [32]
centralpark.com (N/A)
saw.piroscia.com
13 14-08-25 [33]
urbantoronto.ca (N/A)
reserve.sandystrong.org
14 14-08-22 [34]
onlinenewspapers.com (N/A)
c.ic.com.au
15 14-06-28 [35]
N/A (N/A)
zamcheck.org
16 14-06-19 [36]
N/A (N/A)
stat.litecsys.com
*: Proof-of-Concept (PoC) sample.
N/A: Publisher/Ad trafﬁc is redacted or not included in sample.
2*

2.6.1

Experimental Methodology

To answer the research questions, we run PAD on real world ad examples. Speciﬁcally,
we collect 16 malvertising ad samples (for RQ1) and 15 undesired ads (for RQ2). We
gather the source code of publisher web pages and host them on our own web server. For
the cases in which the publisher is not reported or intentionally redacted, we set up a test
page to include the undesired ad(s) on our web server.

2.6.2

Experimental Results

RQ1: Malvertising Attacks.

Table. 2.2 and 2.3 show the malicious ad samples

and the memory protection enforced. Column Publisher lists the websites redirecting to
malware through ad networks. First Ad Redirect and Ad Networks show the ﬁrst malicious
redirect and the ad networks involved in each malicious campaign.
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Table 2.3.: Malicious ad campaigns’ attack vectors.
Ad
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Exploit Kit

Payload

CVE Report

Attack Vector

Neutrino
Trojans
DataView
[37], [38]
Stegano
Spyware
ByteArray
[39], [40], [41], [42]
Magnitude
Cerber*
[39]
ByteArray
*
Magnitude
Cerber
UNREPORTED
ByteArray
Angler
Ransomware
[39]
ByteArray
KaiXin
[43]
Vector
PeCompact2, Trojan
Angler
Spyware
[44], [45]
Uint32Array, Vector
Angler
Poweliks
ByteArray
[46], [47], [48]
[46]
Vector
Sweet Orange
Zemot#
*
Nuclear
[46]
Vector
Cryptowall
[46]
Vector
Sweet Orange
Gimemo Trojan
[46]
Vector
Sweet Orange
Zusy Trojan
#
Nuclear
[46]
Vector
Zemot
Nuclear
[46]
Vector
Zusy Trojan
[46]
Vector
Sweet Orange
Trojan Dropper
Nuclear
[46]
Vector
Zbot, Spyware
*: Ransomware. #: Downloader.

We collect 12 samples of malvertising in the wild and 4 proof-of-concept (PoC) samples from online malvertising reports. 15 of them are exploiting Adobe Flash Player, 3
samples for Internet Explorer and 1 for Microsoft Edge. Note that it is very hard to collect
malvertising samples from the wild, as most malicious campaigns simply change their IPs
or ad networks once they are caught. Moreover, malvertising attacks that exploit zero-day
vulnerabilities make them very difﬁcult to be detected. We have validated that all attacks
can be suppressed by one line of memory protection speciﬁcation. Note that PAD provides
a general protection hence it prevents an unreported case (Ad 4) too.
RQ2: Undesired Ads. We investigate how PAD beneﬁts the protection against intrusive ads (U2), information disclosure ads (U3), inappropriate ads (U4), and nontransparent
ads (U5). Table. 2.4 summarizes our ﬁndings. Column Ad and Date are the reference and
date of the undesired ad. Note that entries with + are ads that are active as the time of
paper submission. The table also shows the Publisher involved in each ad campaign and
the access control speciﬁcation publishers can leverage to suppress each undesired ad.
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For example, ad [49] on nytimes.com redirects users to a malicious page. Developers can leverage our speciﬁcation language block REDIRECTION to disable redirections. [50] on youtube.com directs users to a ﬂash ad which ﬁngerprints users’ browser.
To prevent users’ browsers being ﬁngerprinted, Youtube developers can specify block
BROWSER-VERSION with PAD. Preschool sites funology.com and twistynoodle.com serve
inappropriate ads to children via ad retargeting service. Publishers can use PAD to block
ads from particular domains. Ad [51] serves from ad network domain ero-advertising.com
embedded a Flash ad on stopmalvertising.com to perform DDoS attacks. block EMBEDDED
-FLASH can be used to block such ads.
As shown in the result, all undesired ad behaviors are prevented by enforcing our access
control policies. A detailed case study is discussed in 2.6.3.
Average: 1.702

Page
with PAD

Std: 4.480

Average: 1.674

Page
w/o PAD
0

1

Std: 4.146

2

3

4

5

6

7

Figure 2.11.: Page load latency.

RQ3: Runtime Overhead.

Finally, to understand the runtime overhead induced

by PAD, we study the average latency of rendering a web page with and without PAD.
We choose Alexa top 200 websites, load each page 10 times and calculate the average
load time. As shown in Fig. 2.11, a web browser takes a slightly longer time to render
a web page when it is enforced with our protection. This is because (1) PAD introduces
additional JavaScript and the browser needs extra time to parse the code; (2) the selfpropagating enforcement intercepts the multiple layers of ad delivery on the ﬂy. As the
size of additional JavaScript is small and the interception is lightweight, the overhead of
rendering a page with PAD protection is negligible (1.67%). To avoid different ads being
loaded across runs (of the same website), we save all the contents, including ads, and host
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them on our own proxy. We also used a plugin to check each page load event. The plugin
is designed in such a way that any unsuccessful load causes the browser to hang forever. In
our experiment, we have not encountered any such cases. This suggests that PAD does not
affect normal functionalities (including ads).

Table 2.4.: Access control on undesired ad behaviors.
Type
U2*

U3*

Ad

Date

+

+

[49]
[52]
[52]
[50]
[53]

09-09-13
16-04-12
16-02-06
14-02-20
12-01-21

+

+

U4*

+
+
+
+
[1] 16-12-06
[54] 15-05-12
[55] 15-05-07
U5*
[56] 15-02-04
[57] 15-01-24
[51] 11-07-22
+: The ad is active now.

2.6.3

Publisher

Access Control Spec

watchfomny.tv
block POPUP
torrentz.eu
nytimes.com
block REDIRECTION
N/A
block MIMETYPE
N/A
youtube.com
block BROWSER-VERSION
ﬁleserve.com
block FLASH-PLAYER-VERSION
funology.com
if curUrl == "xxx.com"
twistynoodle.com
realstreamunited.tv
then block LOADING
stream2watch.cc
N/A
randomize CANVAS-DATA
N/A
block LOADING
N/A
block SRCLESS-IFRAME
gopego.com
block EMBEDDED-FLASH
N/A
stopmalvertising.com
N/A: Publisher is redacted or not included in report.

Case Study

In this section, we show three case studies to demonstrate how PAD prevents undesired
ad behavior in practice.
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Type Confusion Vulnerability in Microsoft Edge
Type confusion vulnerabilities have been reported lately in the JS Engine (Chakra) of
Microsoft Edge. When an ad is delivered, JS can be injected for logging and dynamic ad
delivery. Unfortunately, a malicious advertiser can also inject a malicious JS ﬁle to exploit
the vulnerabilities to execute malicious code.
(a) Malicious JavaScript Program (CVE-2016-7200/7201)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

var dv = new DataView( new ArrayBuffer(8) );
Exploit_CVE_2016_7201( ... );
...
var ropPtrAddr = ...; // Address of Stack
var rop = [ ..., 0x20564D603FA, 0x20560000000, ... ];
for (var i = 0; i < rop.length; ++i) {
dv.setUint32( retPtrAddr.add(i * 8), rop[i] );
}

Contents of Stack Memory (Injected payload)
(b) w/o PAD
(c) with PAD
0x20564D603FA

+0x0101...0101

0x0101030665D704FB

0x20560000000

+0x0101...0101

0x0101030661010101

0x211D000A2F5

+0x0101...0101

0x01010312D101A3F6

0x211D000A2CD

+0x0101...0101

0x01010312D101A3CE

...

+0x0101...0101

...

Figure 2.12.: Malicious JavaScript program exploiting DataView.

Fig. 2.12(a) shows a malicious JS program which exploits two vulnerabilities (CVE2016-7200 and CVE-2016-7201). In particular, it ﬁrst creates a DataView object which
will be used to inject a malicious payload at Line 1. Then, at Line 2, it leverages the vulnerabilities to obtain a corrupted DataView object (dv). Speciﬁcally, it exploits CVE-20167201 which is a type confusion vulnerability to obtain the ability to modify a target address
of DataView when it reads and writes. As we discussed in Sec. 2.5.3, a DataView object
internally stores a pointer to a buffer which holds its value and the length of the buffer.
CVE-2016-7201 essentially changes the pointer of the buffer via a type confusion vulnerability. As a result, after Line 2, the JS program can read and write arbitrary memory through
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the corrupted object dv. Speciﬁcally, by changing the ﬁrst argument of setUint32 which
speciﬁes an offset of the DataView’s buffer for writing a value, an attacker can overwrite
values on any address he/she wants to. Then, at Line 3, it obtains a stack address containing
a return address by exploiting address information leak. We omit the detail due to the space
limit. At Line 4, it constructs a malicious ROP payload (rop[]) within an array. Finally,
the program injects the malicious payload at Lines 5-7 through the setUint32() method.
Note that dv is already compromised so that it can point to arbitrary buffer. Therefore, by
providing addresses pointing to the program’s stack, it injects the malicious payload.
PAD protects the attack by mutating input values passed to DataView. In particular,
PAD overrides the DataView.setUint32() to mutate any input parameter. In this example, to make the discussion easier, we mutate the input by adding 1 to every byte of a
value passed to setUint32(). For example, a 0x64D603FA input value will be mutated to
0x65D704FB. Note that in our implementation, we use a one time pad encoding scheme.
Hence, we apply different mutations every time. Fig. 2.12(c) shows an example of a corrupted stack with a simple addition (+1 for each byte). Observe that such a small addition
completely breaks the functionality of the payload and leads the exploit to a crash as the
execution jumps to an unmapped memory.
In addition to overriding setters (e.g., setUint32()), we do also override getters (e.g.,
getUint32()) to decode retrieved values in order to enable seamless execution of benign
program operations via DataView. The decoding performs the exact reverse operation of
the encoding process. For example, if we encode by adding 0x1 to the values, we decode
by subtracting 0x1 at getters invocation.

Pixel Bender Parser Vulnerability in Adobe Flash Player
Similar to the type confusion attack in Microsoft Edge, Vector in AS can be corrupted
by a vulnerability on Pixel Bender Parser which is a high-performance graphic programming interface for image processing.
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7

var vt = new Vector.<int>( ... );
Exploit_CVE-2014-0515( ... );
...
var ropPtrAddr = ...; // Address of Stack
var rop = [ ..., 0x70ff016a, 0x70fff870, ... ];
for ( ... ) {
vt[retPtrAddr + i * 4] = rop[i];
}

Figure 2.13.: Malicious ActionScript program exploiting Vector.

Fig. 2.13 shows a malicious ﬂash ﬁle which contains AS code exploiting CVE-20140515 vulnerability. At Line 1, the code ﬁrst allocates a Vector. The function at line 2
represents exploiting the vulnerability in order to overwrite the length of Vector. Note
that Vector in AS and DataView in JS have similar internal representations and thus share
the same problems of the vulnerable length information. By overwriting the length of
Vector, an attacker can gain arbitrary memory access. Similar to the Edge case, it prepares
ROP gadgets and stack addresses, then injects the ROP payload at Line 6. Note that it uses
the [] operator to inject the payload, instead of invoking a function. To handle this, PAD
also overrides the operator by using defineProperty with index (e.g., 1, 2, and so on).
Note that in JS/AS obj[name] is equivalent to obj.name. Hence, we override obj.1(),
obj.2(), and so on. As in JS, PAD prevents the attack by encoding the values passed
through [] operator.

Preventing Geolocation Information Access
Personalized ads are chosen based on the proﬁle of targeted customers. While it is
valuable to advertisers, collecting sensitive information to deliver targeted ads is quite controversial. When multiple ad networks are involved, it is hard to know and control who
collects what information. Hence, it is important for publishers to protect their customers’
sensitive information from being collected by ad networks or advertisers.
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(a) Ad accesses geo-location
<div id="div-gtp-ad1" ...>
1
<script>
2
navigator.geolocation.
getCurrentPosition( ... );
</script>
...
</div>

(b) Install PAD with Policy Spec
<script src="PAD.js"></script> 3
<pad> block GEO-DATA </pad> 4
...
<div id="div-gtp-ad1" ...>...
</div>

(c) Ad Regulated by PAD
<script>
5
navigator.geolocation.
getCurrentPosition = function() {
return null;
};
6
</script>
...
<div id="div-gtp-ad1" ...>
<script>
navigator.geolocation.
getCurrentPosition( ... );
</script>
...
</div>

Figure 2.14.: Preventing geolocation accesses.

In this case study, we show how PAD enables a publisher to protect its customer’s geolocation from being disclosed to ad networks and advertisers. Fig. 2.14(a) shows the publisher web page without PAD. The tag div with id div-gpt-ad1 ( 1 ) serves as an ad slot
on the page. 2 shows the JS code loaded as a part of the ad delivery. It accesses the geolocation of the customer via the JS interface navigator.geolocation.getCurrentPos
ition.
Fig. 2.14(b) shows how PAD can be employed to enforce the geolocation access control. First, the publisher developer includes <script src="PAD.js"></script> at the
beginning of the page (Fig. 2.14- 3 ). Then, she can add policy spec block GEO-DATA as
shown in Fig. 2.14- 4 to enforce that “blocks geo-data on any delegation (any url)”.
Fig. 2.14(c) shows how PAD enforces the policy at runtime. Speciﬁcally, PAD ﬁrst
overrides navigator.geolocatio n.getCurrentPosition ( 5 ) to intercepts the access to geolocation. When getCurrentPosition is invoked, PAD checks the current
speciﬁcations and applies actions accordingly. In this case, the access control for blocking
geolocation takes effect. PAD returns empty geolocation information instead of returning
the real location( 6 ). Besides blocking, ﬂexible fuzzing methods such as reducing location
accuracy can be easily supported in PAD.
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2.7

Related Work

Malvertising detection. Zarras et al. [58] investigated the source of malvertising and
showed that every publisher without an exclusive agreement with the advertiser is likely
to serve malicious ads. Xing et al. [59] performed a large scale study on malvertising in adinjecting browser extensions. OdoSwiff [17] detects malicious ﬂash ﬁles based on known
patterns in the code and execution traces. In particular, it statically looks for invalid images,
suspicious jumps and APIs used in known exploits. MadTracer [18] detects malvertising
based on rules learned from the ad delivery paths. Stringhini et al. [19] and Mekky et
al. [60] identify malicious content based on HTTP redirections. Poornachandran et al. [20]
proposed a classiﬁer-based malvertising detection approach. As learning based detections
rely on patterns found in known attacks, they may not catch unknown attacks. In contrast,
we break the payloads that are carefully crafted for speciﬁc defects, we can stop the attacks
even targeting at zero-day vulnerabilities.
Ads and security policies. Alt [61] presents an advertising platform based on adaptive
proﬁles, where visitors can setup proﬁles to obtain favorable ads. AdJail [62] is a framework for publishers to specify conﬁdentiality and integrity policies on ads. AdSentry [63]
allows publishers and end users to specify access control policies for ads. Gui et al. [64]
surveyed 21 Android apps and identiﬁed several undesired consequences of ads including
hidden costs and complaints. They further studied 400 mobile ad reviews to identify complaint topics [65]. Hussein et al. [66] use a runtime veriﬁcation tool to enforce security
speciﬁcation for Java. Ghotbi and Fischer [67] presents a ﬁne-grained role- and attributebased access control model. We focus on developing a policy language for publishers so
that they can easily specify how PAD operates.
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3 WEBRANZ: WEB PAGE RANDOMIZATION FOR BETTER

ADVERTISEMENT DELIVERY AND WEB-BOT PREVENTION
Nowadays, a rapidly increasing number of web users are using ad blockers to block online
advertisements. ad blockers are browser-based software that can block most Ads on the
websites, speeding up web browsers and saving bandwidth. Despite these beneﬁts to end
users, ad blockers could be catastrophic for the economic structure underlying the web,
especially considering the rise of Ad blocking as well as the number of technologies and
services that rely exclusively on Ads to compensate their cost. In this chapter, we introduce
WebRanz that utilizes a randomization mechanism to circumvent ad blockers. Using WebRanz, content publishers can constantly mutate the internal HTML elements and element
attributes of their web pages, without affecting their visual appearances and functionalities.
Randomization invalidates the pre-deﬁned patterns that ad blockers use to ﬁlter out Ads.
Though the design of WebRanz is motivated by evading ad blockers, WebRanz also beneﬁts
the defense against bot scripts. We evaluate the effectiveness of WebRanz and its overhead
using 221 randomly sampled top-alexa web pages and 8 representative bot scripts.

3.1

Introduction
Online advertising is the primary source of income for many Internet companies, such

as the IT giants Google and Facebook. According to [68], the revenue of U.S. web advertising is as large as $15 billion in Q3 2015. With Ad supports, online services give us instant
access to more information than was ever stored in the entirety of the world’s libraries just
a few decades ago. Ad-supported services also create and maintain systems that allow for
instant communication and organization between more than a billion people. Without web
advertising, many of the world’s most useful technologies may never have occurred.
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Ad blocker is a piece of software that allows a user to roam the web without encountering any Ads. In particular, it utilizes network control and in-page manipulation to help
users block most online advertisements. Network control barricades HTTP requests to
Ads and thus prevents them from loading. In-page manipulation looks up Ads based on
pre-determined patterns and makes them invisible.
With ad blockers, web browsers generally run faster and waste less bandwidth downloading Ads, and the users are no longer distracted by the Ads. Not surprisingly, ad blocking is gaining popularity with an astonishing pace. According to a survey by Adobe and an
ad blocking measurement service PageFair, 16% of the US Internet users run ad blocking
software in their browsers [69]. Approximately 198 million active users globally used ad
blocking tools in 2015, up by 41% compared to 2014. AdBlock Plus [70], a leading ad
blocker, claims that their product has been downloaded at an average rate of 2.3 million
times per week since 2013 and it is “at a steady clip” [71]. In addition, more iPhone and
iPad users start running Ad blockers thanks to the built-in capacities in the latest iOS 9.
Despite its tangible convenience to the customers, ad blocking could devastate the economic structure underlying the web in the long run. This is because many content publishers make their primary legitimate income from Ads, but ad blocking is destroying this
ecosystem. In 2014, Google made $59.1 billion from advertising, but lost $6.6 billion due
to ad blocking [72]. During 2015, ad blocking has cost Internet companies almost $22
billion [69]. The number will rise to 41.4 billion in 2016. Many games-related websites
currently encounter about 50% revenue loss due to ad blocking [73]. It is suggested that
if everybody used ad blockers, ad-supported Internet services would vanish. “it’s the websites that ad-block users most love that are going out of business ﬁrst. This is to no one’s
beneﬁt” [73].
Furthermore, since ad blockers use pre-deﬁned patterns to identify and suppress DOM
objects that appear to be Ads, it is often the case that the patterns are so general that part
of the regular content is also blocked. As shown in Fig. 3.1, the text links marked in the
red circle on the homepage of www.autotrader.com, as part of the regular content, are
inappropriately blocked by Adblock.
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Figure 3.1.: Non-ads on www.autotrader.com blocked. Left: no Adblock. Right: with
Adblock.

To damp the negative effect of ad blockers on the web ecosystem, tech companies and
service providers introduce many solutions [74–78]. For example, one common approach
is to integrate to a web page an in-page JavaScript snippet that examines the presentation of
Ads and identiﬁes the presence of ad blocker. Furthermore, such approaches often demand
the users turn off their ad blockers or subscribe to a website’s paywall. Despite the effectiveness in detecting ad blocker’s presence, such technologies often substantially degrade
the user experience with websites. More importantly, they still fail to punch through ad
blockers to serve the originally-intended Ads.
In this chapter, we develop a technique that allows the content publishers to deliver their
Ads without being blocked. Our goal is to retain a healthy web ecosystem by providing an
option for the content publishers to protect their legitimate right. Our technique, WebRanz,
circumvents ad blocking using a content and URL randomization mechanism. With WebRanz, the publishers can constantly mutate their web content – including HTML, CSS and
JavaScript – so that ad blockers cannot ﬁnd the pre-determined patterns to ﬁlter out Ads.
More importantly, WebRanz retains the functionalities of the original page and minimizes
the visual differences caused by randomization so that the user experience is not affected.
WebRanz ensures that multiple accesses of the same website return different content pages
that have the same appearances and functionalities.
Speciﬁcally, since a lot of Ads are loaded by third-party JavaScript on the client side,
without going through the original content publisher server, the pages returned by the server
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need to be instrumented so that the Ad contents generated on the client side can be randomized. WebRanz overwrites native JavaScript APIs so that dynamic DOM objects can
be randomized on the ﬂy when they are generated through the overwritten APIs.
Besides, Ad blockers also cancel network requests to blacklisted URLs by comparing URLs against pre-deﬁned patterns. To bypass, WebRanz randomizes the URLs and
resource requested is fetched via a transparent proxy hosted by content publishers.
While WebRanz is developed for circumventing ad blocker scourges, last but not the
least, our design principle also beneﬁts the defense against many unwanted bot scripts that
launch automated attacks on websites as these bots also manipulate DOM objects using
pre-determined patterns.
In summary, WebRanz makes the following contributions.
• We propose a web page randomization technique WebRanz that prevents ad blockers
from expunging Ads on web pages, and helps defending against web bots. At the

same time, WebRanz preserves page appearances and functionalities.
• We address the challenges entailed by URL and web page randomization such as

preserving dependencies between DOM objects and CSS selectors, between DOM

elements and JavaScript, and handling dynamic generated elements as well as resolving randomized URLs.
• We implement WebRanz and it’s publically available at [79]. We evaluate it using
221 randomly sampled top-alexa web pages and 8 real-world bot scripts. We show

that WebRanz is effective in circumventing ad blockers with negligible overhead. It
also defeats all the tested bot scripts.

3.2

Motivation
In this section, we show how ad blockers and web bots work in practice. We explain

how pattern matching based page element lookup plays an important role in these two. We
then overview our approach.
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1. <di v i d=" j _i d_1_20n" . . . >
2.
<di v cl ass=" at cui - col umn at cui - span- 8" . . . >
3.
<i mg sr c=" ht t p: / / www. aut ot r ader st at i c. com/ . . . / 190954. j pg" al t =" Tr ade I n" >
4.
...
5.
</ di v>
6.
<di v cl ass=" at cui - col umn at cui - span- 7" . . . >
7.
<i mg sr c=" ht t p: / / www. aut ot r ader st at i c. com/ . . . / 153434. j pg" al t =" Sel l Your Car " >
8.
...
9.
</ di v>
10. </ di v>

Figure 3.2.: Static ads on www.autotrader.com.

3.2.1

Ad Blocking

Web advertising is one of the foundations of Internet economy. Most content publishers
earn their revenue by delivering Ads. When a page is loaded, the Ads loaded often go
through many layers of delegations and redirections. We call it the Ad delivery path. We
classify Ads into two categories based on the loading procedure. Those that are literally
included by the content page are called the static Ads and those dynamically loaded are
called the dynamic Ads.
Static Ads. Static Ads are usually served by the content publishers and delivered from a
central domain. For example, Fig. 3.2 shows two static Ads on the home page of www.
autotrader.com. They are two images with their URLs at lines 3 and 7 in the HTML
ﬁle. Observe that the URLs are explicitly encoded in the source code. In other words, the
Ads are not dynamically loaded by JavaScript.
Dynamic Ads. Dynamic Ads are usually provided by online advertisement vendors or Ad
networks, and hosted on servers other than the publisher server. Compared to static Ads,
they can be served from multiple domains owned by various Ad networks. They are usually
dynamically loaded and may be different in each load. Hence, Ads networks are able to
deliver customized Ads to maximize their revenue.
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Figure 3.3.: Page www.much.com. The ad is enclosed by <div id = “div-gpt-ad-300 2501”> in the red cycle.

We use www.much.com as an example to illustrate dynamic Ad delivery. It serves the
latest music videos and entertainment news. It ranks #6 in the category “Music Videos” of
Alexa top sites [80]. Fig. 3.3 shows the top portion of the website. The Ad marked in the
red cycle is dynamically loaded from Google DoubleClick Ad Exchange service. Fig. 3.4
shows its loading procedure which consists of 10 steps, each loading and executing some
JavaScript, until the Ad is ﬁnally displayed. The related source code is shown in Fig. 3.5.
The code is substantially simpliﬁed for readability. The HTML after Ad loading is shown
in Fig. 3.6. The script in blue in Fig. 3.5 is replaced with the script in blue in Fig. 3.6
after loading. The div in red in the original page is replaced with that in red after loading,
containing an iframe with the Ad image. Particularly, the loading procedure contains the
following 10 steps (Fig. 3.4):
• Steps 1-2. The browser loads the home page. The HTML returned by the server is

shown lines 1-14 in Fig. 3.5. When the script in lines 3-6 is executed, a new script
element is added to the page (line 3 in Fig. 3.6).

• Steps 3-4. The browser parses the new script element and then executes gpt.js from
www.googletagservices.com. The script (i.e. line 23 in Fig. 3.5) inserts another
script pubads impl 69r.js to the page (line 4 in Fig. 3.6).
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gpt.js
Homepage

[9] Request image
added in [8]

[6] Insert an
external JS

pubads_impl_69r.js

[10] Ads image

bs.serving‐sys.com
adServer.bs?cn=…

[8] Insert an
external image

[7] Request JS inserted in [6]

securepubads.g.doubleclick.net
ads?gdfp_req=1&…

Figure 3.4.: An example of dynamic ads loading.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

<head>
<script type="text/javascript">
var gads = document.createElement('script') ;
gads.src = "http://www.googletagservices.com/.../gpt.js";
var node = document.getElementsByTagName("script")[0];
node.parentNode.insertBefore(gads, node);
</script>
</head>
...
<body>
...
<div id = "div-gpt-ad-300_250-1"> </div>
...
</body>

21. /***
gpt.js
***/
22. /***********************************************/
23. ...document.write('<script type="text/javascript" src="http://partner.googleadservices.com/gpt/pub
ads_impl_69r.js"></script>');
24. ...
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

/***
pubads_impl_69r.js
***/
/***********************************************/
// add "iframe" to the children list of a "div"
...
f = document.createElement("iframe");
f.id = "google_ads_iframe_...";
f.contentWindow.document.write("<script>function cbProxy(ad){...document.write(ad);}</script>");

38. f.contentWindow.document.write("<script src=\"securepubads.g.doubleclick.net/.../ads?...");
39. e = document.getElementById("div-gpt-ad-300_250-1") ;
40. e.appendChild(f);
51.
52.
53.
54.

/*** securepubads.g.doubleclick.net/...ads ? ***/
/***********************************************/
// Insert the actual Ad image
cbProxy("...<img src=\"http://bs.serving-sys.com/BurstingPipe/adServer.bs?cn=bsr...");

Figure 3.5.: Dynamic ads loading on www.much.com.
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

<head>
...
<script src="http://www.googletagservices.com/tag/js/gpt.js"></script>
<script src="http://partner.googleadservices.com/gpt/pubads_impl_69r.js"></script>
...
</head>
<body>
<div id="div-gpt-ad-300_250-1">
<iframe id="google_ads_iframe_...">
<img src="http://ds.serving-sys.com/...">
...
</iframe>
</div>
</body>

Figure 3.6.: HTML after loading.

• Steps 5-6. The browser loads pubads impl 69r.js from partner.googleadservic

es.com. This script creates an iframe (lines 35-36) and adds it to the div at line 12
in the original page (lines 39-40). In lines 37-38, the script writes two new script
elements to the iframe. At line 37, it adds the deﬁnition of a function cbProxy() to
the iframe. The function writes an Ad (provided as the parameter) to the page. At line
38, the script adds a new script element whose source is hosted by securepubads.
g.doubleclick.net, a Google Ad service provider. The URL is parameterized

for targeted advertising. In particular, the server side logic takes the parameters and
identify the Ad(s) that should be pushed to a particular client.
• Steps 7-8. The script is loaded from securepubads.g.doubleclick.net. The
source code is shown in line 54. The script invokes cbProxy(), which is supposed to

be deﬁned by other scripts in the earlier steps, to write an Ad image URL to the page.
The image is hosted by the MediaMind Advertising Server (serving-sys.com)
owned by an advertising company Sizmek. This leads to the iframe in red in Fig. 3.6.
• Steps 9-10. Finally, the browser loads and renders the actual Ad image.

How Ads are Blocked
From the previous discussion, the Ad delivery path may be long and complex. If any of
the steps along the path are broken, the Ad is blocked. Most ad blockers leverages this char-
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acteristics. They recognize steps on Ad delivery paths by pattern matching. They maintain
a long list of patterns that can be used to distinguish Ads from normal page content. Take
Adblock Plus [70] as an example. Ads are usually blocked by the following two means.
Network Control by URL Filtering. Since advertising companies serve Ads on a limited
number of servers, it’s possible to collect a set of domain names and block requests sent to
domains on the URL blacklist. For example, the request to “https://securepubads.g.
doubleclick.net/.../ads?...” sent in step [7] in Fig. 3.4 will be blocked by a URL
based rule “/securepubads.”. As a result, the loading procedure is interrupted since the
browser cannot obtain the actual Ads enclosed in the response.
In-page Manipulation by Selector-based Filtering. Elements not blocked by network
control can be successfully loaded from the remote servers. However, they can still be
blocked before they are rendered by the browser. This is done by identifying Ad elements
inside the browser using selector patterns and setting these elements to invisible. For example, in Fig. 3.5, two Ad related DOM elements are set to invisible based on the following
two selectors. Consequently, the Ad image is not rendered.
(1) Selector ##div[id ˆ =“div-gpt-ad-”] matches the div element with id that starts with
div-gpt-ad-. As such, the div (line 8 in Fig. 3.6) is set to invisible.
(2) Selector ##iframe[id ˆ =“google ads iframe”] selects the iframe with id begins with
google ads iframe. Therefore, the iframe at line 9 in Fig. 3.6) is hidden.

3.2.2

Content-Sensitive Web Bots

Web bots are programs that simulate user browsing behavior. They read the HTML
code, analyze the content and interact with the web app just like humans. Web bots are
commonly used for various purposes such as searching, scraping and impersonation. According to a recent study on 20, 000 popular websites by Incapsula Inc., out of 15 billion
visits observed, 56% of all trafﬁc is generated by bots [81].
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1. <html>
2.
...
3.
<a class="button-called-out button-full" href=
"//outlet.lenovo.com/.../?sb=:000001BD:0002F49B:">Add to cart</a>
4.
...
5. </html>

Figure 3.7.: The source of the “Add to cart” button. The page has totally 109 <a> elements.
1. content = open_url(item_url_full,...)
2. tmp_found = re.findall(r"<a class=\"button‐called‐out buttonfull\"(.+?)Add to
cart", content, ...)
3. if len(tmp_found) != 0:
4.
itemid = re.findall(r"\?sb=(.+?)\"", tmp_found[0], ...)
5.
new_addtocart_url = '//outlet.lenovo.com/...AddToCart? addtocart‐itemid='+
itemid[0]
6.
webbrowser.open(new_addtocart_url)

Figure 3.8.: A web bot [82] for the Lenovo outlet.

Bots can be roughly classiﬁed into two groups based on the targets. Some do not focus
on particular items but grab all contents. Bots targeting search engines are examples of
this type. The bots in the other group focus on speciﬁc elements. They parse the HTML
and locate the targets using predeﬁned patterns. Once found, they either simulate human
behaviors (e.g., clicking buttons) or extract valuable data. Data theft by web scraping
and human impersonators are typical examples. Since being able to locate the targets is
important, we dub them content-sensitive web bots.
Content-sensitive web bots such as scrappers have caused substantial loss. According to
ScrapeSentry, 39% of booking trafﬁc on travel industry websites is generated by scraping
bots [83]. As a result, airlines have increased booking fees to balance the cost [84]. A
scraper also demonstrated its capabilities in causing damages through the Twitter earnings
leak incident [85, 86]. In April 2015, Twitter planed to release its Q1 earning report after
the stock market was closed. However, the report link was mistakenly posted online before
the schedule. Although it was deleted immediately, it stayed online for 45s. A ﬁnancial
scraper owned by Selerity discovered the report in such a short time and tweeted Twitter’s
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disappointing result when the market was still open. As a result, shares of Twitter fell as
much as 22%.
Content-sensitive web bots are also widely used on Ecommerce websites. Take a bot
[82] targeting at the Lenovo outlet store as an example. The Lenovo outlet store offers
substantially discounted computers but the quantity is limited. It is usually hard to get one
since many people keep refreshing the inventory and grab a deal as soon as it becomes
available. While it is tedious for a human to repeat this procedure, a bot was programmed
to monitor the store and add deals to the shopping cart automatically.
Fig. 3.7 shows the HTML code of the “Add to cart” button. It is an <a> element
representing a link. There are totally 109 <a> elements on this page. Fig. 3.8 shows a
snippet of the web bot. The script loads a product page at line 1. It hence tries to locate the
“Add to cart” link. Since there are many <a> elements, the script has to distinguish the
target from the others. It does so by comparing the style class name and the element id of
a candidate link with some patterns. In this case, at line 2, the script uses two style class
names “button-called-out” and “button-full” as the signature. If such an <a> is found, at
line 4, it further extracts the id from the content after “sb=” in the link. In this example,
the itemid is “:000001BD:0002F49B:”. Then it constructs the actual add-to-cart link at line
5 and invokes the browser at line 6 to add the item to the shopping cart.
As observed above, a critical precondition for content-sensitive web bots is that they
identify important DOM objects by pattern matching, which is similar to ad blockers.

3.2.3

Our Solution: Web Page Randomization

WebRanz is a technique that randomizes both URLs and content in web pages so that
ad blockers and content based web bots can no longer use pattern matching to identify and
manipulate DOM elements.
As mentioned before, web pages may be changed dynamically on the client side. Therefore the randomization is performed not only on the server side by the content publisher, but
also on the client side through JavaScript instrumentation added to the page by the content
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Figure 3.9.: Overview of the web page randomization.

publisher. In particular, upon receiving a client side request, the publisher prepares the page
as usual. Before delivering it to the client, WebRanz randomizes the page by randomizing
the element ids, style sheets, URLs, and so on.
The randomization is designed in such a way that it does not change the visual effects
and functionalities of the page but rather the internal representations of the page. As such,
the changes are transparent to the end user. WebRanz also inserts JavaScript code to the
page to randomize the page content dynamically generated on the client side.
Fig. 3.9 shows the overview of the web page randomization procedure. WebRanz is
deployed on the server side (publishers). The input is an HTML ﬁle and its corresponding
external CSS style-sheets. The HTML ﬁle can be a static HTML page or the output of a
dynamic server side script before being sent out. The existing external JavaScript and other
resource ﬁles (e.g., images) are untouched. They will be sent to the clients upon requests.
We randomize the attributes (e.g. element id or style class name) and URLs in HTML
and external CSS style-sheets. As such, the selector-based and URL based ﬁlters used in ad
blockers and web bots can no longer identify the page elements. The output is a random-
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ized version of the input HTML page and CSS style-sheets. In the HTML, we also append
utilities that redirect the DOM selectors in the existing JavaScript to the corresponding randomized HTML elements and handle DOM elements dynamically inserted in the browser.
The former is to make sure the JavaScript in the original page can work properly with the
randomized version, especially when the script accesses DOM elements. The latter is to
handle DOM elements we do not see during the server side randomization.
For the www.much.com example, the div and iframe in red in Fig. 3.6 are given random ids such that the aforementioned Adblock Plus patterns fail to locate and suppress
the Ad image. For the Lenovo web bot example, the class name at line 3 of Fig. 3.7
“button-called-out button-full” is replaced with a random string that changes each
time the page is loaded. As such, the web bot in Fig. 3.8 cannot identify the link and fail to
put the product in cart.
Besides, to resolve the randomized URLs, we leverage transparent proxies deployed
on the publisher side. In particular, all URLs (either statically embedded or dynamically
loaded) randomized by server-side and client-side randomizer point to publisher’s transparent proxies. Note that the proxy URL can be arbitrary and different in each load. Or,
we may just use the publisher’s top-level domain (e.g. cnn.com) to bypass the URL ﬁlter.
Once requested, the transparent proxies recover the real URLs, fetch the resource requested
and send them to the client.

3.3

Web Page Randomization
As third party contents (including ads) are usually loaded dynamically and could be

different in each load, a publisher may not be able to determine which elements should be
randomized or which paths should be changed in advance. In order to achieve practical
web page randomization, WebRanz needs to handle a few technical challenges:
• Randomization causes inconsistencies between DOM objects and their style speciﬁcation, between HTML elements and JavaScript.
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Table 3.1.: AdBlock Plus EasyList ﬁlters.
URL Blocking Rules
Domain only Resource only
5, 054
13, 811

Element
Hiding Rules
27, 114

Exception
Rules
3, 973

• Client side randomization should be supported by instrumenting the page with the
randomization logic (in JavaScript) executed on the client side.

• The server side needs to be extended to resolve the randomized URLs that change
constantly.

In the following subsections, we ﬁrst discuss what elements should be randomized. We
then discuss how they are randomized. The discussion is divided into two parts: randomization performed on the (publisher) server side and that on the client side by the JavaScript
instrumentation.

3.3.1

What to Randomize

One of the most important design goals of WebRanz is to retain the appearances and
functionalities of web pages while breaking the patterns used by ad blockers and web bots.
Hence, not all HTML elements or element attributes are subject to randomization. For
example, changing the type of a DOM object (e.g., a radio box to a check box) or changing
the style may cause undesirable visual differences. To identify randomization candidates,
we perform the following two studies: First, we analyze EasyList, the blacklist used by
AdBlock Plus, to select important attributes. Second, we visit the home pages of Alexa
Top 500 websites using different blacklist settings and evaluate the effectivenesses of URLbased and element hiding ﬁlters.

Interpreting Patterns in Blacklisting Rules
Adblock Plus works based on a set of rules. We classify these rules to three categories,
as shown in Table 3.1:
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Table 3.2.: Element hiding ﬁlters.
Selectors
General Rule
Site Speciﬁc
Total

16, 037
11, 077
27, 114

id

class

7, 269
3, 979
11, 248

8, 538
4, 331
12, 869

id and
class
23
112
135

id or class
15, 784 (98.42%)
8, 198 (74.01%)
23, 982 (88.45%)

• The URL blocking rules specify URL ﬁlters for network control. Any requests to
blacklisted URLs are canceled. They can be further divided into two sub-groups:
domain only patterns (e.g., http://*.much.com) and resource patterns with both
domains and resource paths (e.g., http://*.much.com/banner.jpg).
• The exception rules disable existing rules on particular domains. Filters are not applied on domains that match the whitelist.

• The element hiding rules specify selector based ﬁlters. The HTML elements on the
page that match the rules are prevented from rendering.

Observe that the URL blocking and element hiding rules are dominant, and most URL
blocking rules are those that contain both the domain and the resource path.
Each element hiding rule is a selector deﬁned by one or more attributes. To determine
the attributes that are important for randomization, we further study the 15, 701 element
hiding rules in the Adblock Plus’s list. The results are presented in Table 3.2. We observe
that attributes id and class are most commonly used: id is a unique identiﬁer of an HTML
element in the document; class provides a class name for one or more HTML elements.
Adblockers hide elements using style rules. A style rule consists of a selector and a declaration block. The selector points to the HTML element(s) where the style declared is applied to. The declaration block contains visual effect speciﬁcations such as size and layout.
The style rules can be a piece of in-line script in HTML or an external style-sheet CSS ﬁle.
Examples of element hiding rules are shown as follows. ##.googleads-container matches
elements with class googleads-container. A composite hiding rule ###resultspanel >
#topads is to select the element that has id topads and is enclosed in an element with id
resultpanel.
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Table 3.3.: Elements blocked on Alexa top 500 sites.

Min
Max
Average

Full EasyList
URL Hiding
0
0
171
18
5.3
0.8

Domain
Only
0
91
3.8

Resource
Only
0
171
4.2

Element Hiding
Rules Only
0
19
0.9

Evaluating Filters on Popular Websites
In the second study, we collect the number of elements removed by the URL blocking
rules and the element hiding rules and evaluate their effectiveness on real world websites.
We ﬁrst collect the data using the original full EasyList. As the URL blocking rules and
element hiding rules are not orthogonal, we repeat the experiment using different subset
rules in EasyList: (1) URL blocking rules that only contain domains (domain only), (2)
URL blocking rules that have both domain and resource paths (resource only) and (3)
Element hiding rules. The results are shown in Table 3.3. On the one hand, the URL based
rules block more than 6 times elements than the element hiding rules on popular web pages.
On the other hand, the fact that more than half rules are element hiding rules shows that
they are important as URL blocking rules cannot handle all cases without any overkills.
As suggested by above two studies, id and class are critical attributes used by selectors in
the element hiding rules. Besides, bypassing the URL blocking rules is crucial. Therefore,
WebRanz aims to randomize id, class and URLs. That would allow us to counter 85.8% of
all rules, which represent the dominating majority applied in practice.

3.3.2

Server Side Randomization

WebRanz is deployed on the publisher server. Part of the randomization is performed
directly on the server side. In this subsection, we discuss the server side randomization. It
mainly consists of randomizing the id and class attributes, ﬁxing styling rules and randomizing URLs.
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Randomizing Element Id and Class
Before a page retrieved/generated by the publisher server is returned to the client, WebRanz parses the page and then traverses the DOM tree. During traversal, it replaces each
id or class name encountered with some random value. It also maintains a one-to-one mapping between the original id/class name and its randomized counter-part.
This mapping is the key to preserving the semantics and functionalities and will be used
in later steps. Note that it is possible that multiple HTML elements have the same id. In
this case, WebRanz also projects them to the same random value. We also want to point out
that the server does not need to keep the mapping in any permanent storage as it is never
reused. In other words, each page returned to some client is randomized independently.

Fixing Static HTML Style Rules
Style rules determine the visual effects of a class of DOM elements. Styles can be
speciﬁed in the following ways:
• An inline attribute is deﬁned along with the DOM element. E.g., <div style=“border:
10pt”> speciﬁes that the div element has a border of 10 points.

• An internal style is deﬁned in the header. E.g., <style type=“text/css”>.sidebar{
width: 100%; }</style> sets the width of element(s) with class of “sidebar”.

• An external rule is speciﬁed in a CSS ﬁle and embedded in the HTML. E.g. <link
rel = “stylesheet” href = “1.css”> includes style rules deﬁned in 1.css.

• A style can be dynamically deﬁned by a property setter in JavaScript. E.g. getElementById(“x1”).style= {border:1pt} sets the border of the element with id of “x1”.

This is often used to deﬁne styles on the client side.

The inlined style is not affected by randomization. In contrast, the internal and external
rules have to be updated since the id/class names in those style rules need to be made
consistent with the randomized id/class names.
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Example. In Fig. 3.10, the HTML code contains a div (lines 4-6) whose style is speciﬁed in
lines 1-3. Observe that the strings “U7n231k” and “hcd1nc” are the randomized values for
“o�ce-sessions-widget” and “video-item” respectively. Since the rule name and the class
name of the HTML element are updated consistently, the visual representation is preserved.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

<style type="text/css">
.office-sessions-widget .video-item {...}
</style>
<div class="office-sessions-widget">
<div class="video-item">...</div>
</div>

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

<style type="text/css">
.U7n231k .hcd1nc {...}
</style>
<div class="U7n231k">
<div class="hcd1nc">...</div>
</div>

Figure 3.10.: An example of class randomization.

WebRanz only ﬁxes static style rules on the server side. For dynamic styles that
are deﬁned by property setters or inserted by in-page JavaScript, WebRanz relies on the
JavaScript instrumentation to ensure consistency (on the client side). More details can be
found in Section 3.3.3.

Randomizing Static URLs
As mentioned earlier, ad blockers work by blocking URLs or hiding elements. Randomizing id/class prevents element lookup by selectors. WebRanz also performs URL
randomization to evade URL blocking.
WebRanz traverses the DOM tree of the page and identiﬁes all URLs in the page. For
those that can be matched by URL blocking rules, WebRanz randomizes the whole URL
including domain, resource path and all parameters. In particular, it takes the whole URL
and randomize the string using public-key cryptography. This is to make sure that the ad
blocker on the client side cannot recover the original URL for the randomized version, as
the private key will not be sent to the client.
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Original version:
1. <script src="http://www.googletagservices.com/tag/js/gpt.js"></script>

Randomized version:
11. <script src="http://$proxy_url$/$proxy_script_name$.php?$para_name$=
LAhrcs229BprSLk06FyHcdnniVF1HnaVymtfv1T0ZiCY8D5FlRSl5CZ4p68nqymiRZTJ5z5d
iGJk89/8NkjmSuLBOKKjXNiIXeG5dkx3Bd2Jo0T4A0Nq4rHVwfSezYnY6aqOZnqjcVaBKOl2
dXxaTI17uk44t6HQDJ5KM879yu0="></script>

Note: $proxy_url$, $proxy_script_name$ and $para_name$ can be different in each load

Figure 3.11.: An example of URL randomization.

Fig. 3.11 shows an example of URL randomization. Line 1 is an external script. Line
11 is the corresponding randomized version. The randomized URL is sent to $proxy url$,
a URL pointing to the transparent proxy, as a request parameter. The original URL is
replaced with this randomized version. Please note that the proxy URL $proxy url$ and
$proxy script name$ can be arbitrary valid URL pointing to a publisher’s proxy. We can
make it a moving target or simply use the publisher’s top-level domain to host a pool of
proxy scripts. Therefore, blocking the URL to transparent proxies is impractical. Otherwise, all content hosted by this publisher will be blocked.

Transparent Proxy
The original URLs are reshaped to evade URL blocking rules by randomization. Since
domain names are also changed, to make sure the client can correctly load the original
resource, we use a group of transparent proxies deployed on the publisher side to fetch the
resource for the client.
In particular, when the transparent proxy receives a request, it decodes the parameter
and recovers the original URL. It then sends a request with original data from the client (including cookies) to the original destination. Once the response arrives, the proxy forwards
it to the client. Note that if the requested URL points to a local resource, the proxy directly
loads and returns it to the client in order to minimize the performance overhead.
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In addition, besides URL, the src of an image or script may be a data URI that is the
ﬁle content itself [87]. Data URIs are also randomized as they can be used to deliver Ads.
When the proxy receives such data URI request, it directly returns the decoded data with
its corresponding header. For example, if a data URI request is an image type, the proxy
decodes the image data in the request and adds an image header to the response.

3.3.3

Preserving Client-Side Functionalities and Handling Dynamically Loaded Elements

Both the DOM interface and third-party libraries (e.g. jQuery) provide many ways to
access HTML elements. After randomization, the original attribute values are replaced
with the random ones. However, the DOM element selectors in existing JavaScript still use
the original values such that they cannot locate the correct elements anymore.
In order to provide consistent accesses to randomized DOM elements, one way is to
scan the JavaScript in the page and update all the selector values, similar to ﬁxing the static
style rules. However, since third-party JavaScript ﬁles are loaded dynamically on the ﬂy,
it is infeasible to update all these ﬁles during the server side randomization. Instead, we
choose to override the relevant JavaScript APIs and map the original attribute values to
their corresponding randomized versions at runtime whenever the attributes are accessed.

Overriding Element Selectors
The Document Object Model (DOM) deﬁnes a programming interface to access and
manipulate HTML elements and their properties. Speciﬁcally, the reference to an HTML
element can be acquired using an id selector (getElementById) or a class selector (getElementsByClassName).
Therefore, WebRanz overrides these two methods. It projects the original attribute
value to the corresponding randomized value as follows: if a value has been randomized,
the original selector value is replaced by the corresponding randomized value. Otherwise,
the same value is used. The overridden version of document.getElementById() is shown in
Fig. 3.12. At line 1, the original document.getElementById() is saved in variable byID. Line
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1. var byId = document.__proto__.getElementById;
2. document.__proto__.getElementById = function(id) {
3.
if (idMap[id]) {
4.
return byId.call(document, idMap[id]);
5.
}
6.
else {return byId.call(document, id);}
7. };

Figure 3.12.: Override document.getElementById().

3 checks if a mapping exists. If so, it calls byID with the corresponding randomized value.
Note that idMap[] projects an original value to its randomized version. The overridden
functions and the mappings are inserted to the page and sent over to the client. As such,
the element access redirection happens at runtime on the client side.
WebRanz uses a predeﬁned set of obfuscations for preventing the mappings from being
automatically reverse engineered. For example, idMap[] is encrypted differently each time
the page is loaded and the overridden element lookup functions have the corresponding
decryption methods. Even though in theory the attackers (to our approach) can still inject
some exhaustive scanning JavaScript (to the page) to repetitively call the overridden API
functions to reverse engineer the mappings, the cost is so high that the user experience of
the page would be substantially degraded. More discussion can be found in Section 3.4.4.

Overriding Third-party JavaScript Library APIs
Although third-party JavaScript libraries can provide various element access interfaces
using different kinds of selectors, many of them eventually need to invoke some primitive
DOM interface function. Take jQuery, one of the most popular third-party JS libraries, as
an example.
JQuery provides efﬁcient ways to access HTML elements through web API functions.
For example, $(.className) selects all elements with class className. Its underlying implementation is based on the primitive API getElementsByClassName(). Since WebRanz
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has overridden the primitive element lookup functions, the corresponding jQuery selectors
can locate the correct HTML elements as well.

1. hasClass: function(a) {
2.
if (classMap[a])
3.
a = classMap[a];
4.
// the actual HTML element look-up
5. }

Figure 3.13.: Override jQuery .hasClass().

Besides the two primitive element look-up functions, WebRanz also overrides a set
of higher-level DOM manipulation APIs, such as .addClass(), .attr() and .hasClass().
Fig. 3.13 shows the handling of .hasClass() provided by jQuery. In lines 1-2, classMap
maps a class name to its randomized version. The actual look-up is done using the value
after mapping. Obfuscation is also used to protect classMap.

Randomizing Dynamically Generated Elements
Elements Dynamically generated are common on the client side. The script manipulating them may be from the publisher or third parties such as Ad-networks. The new
elements and the modiﬁed element attributes need to be randomized as well otherwise ad
blockers may block them.

1. var idSetter = idProperty(element.__proto__.__proto__).set;
2. var idGetter = idProperty(element.__proto__.__proto__).get;
3. Object.defineProperty(element.__proto__.__proto__, 'id', {
4.
set: function(arg) {
5.
randId = randIdGenerator(...);
6.
idSetter.call(this, randId);
7.
},
8.
get: function() {
9.
return reverseIdMap[idGetter.call(this)];
10. }
11. });

Figure 3.14.: Override the setter and getter of id.
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Overriding Property Setters and Getters. Existing JavaScript may modify or read attribute values, such as the values of id and class. For example, element.id = id1 sets id1
as the id of an HTML element. To make them consistent, we also need to provide bidirectional mappings between the original values and the corresponding randomized versions. Fig. 3.14 shows an example of such wrappers. The references to the original getter
and setter are saved in lines 1-2. In lines 4-7, the ‘id’ setter is overridden. When set, a
random id is generated at line 5 and set by the original setter at line 6. The getter is shown
in lines 8-10. Function reverseIdMap() projects a randomized value to its original one. At
line 9, the getter function returns the original id value.
Overriding DOM Elements Creating Function. WebRanz also intercepts a set of DOM
object creation functions that require id and/or class as part of the parameters, such as
element.setAttribute(class, class1) sets attribute class of a newly created element to class1.
It then generates random id and class. The instrumentation is similar to that of setters and
getts and hence elided.
Randomizing URL Appended. WebRanz intercepts APIs that append elements to the web
page and rewrites enclosed URLs using the same method discussed in Sec. 3.3.2.

3.4

Evaluation
In this section, we describe our implementation and evaluate the effectiveness and ef-

ﬁciency of WebRanz in preventing ad blocking and web bots. Experiments are done on a
machine with Intel i7 2.8GHz CPU, 16GB, and OS X Yosemite.

3.4.1

Implementation

We implemented WebRanz using Node.js [88]. In particular, we augment the htmlparser2 [89] with the ability to parse static HTML pages and randomize the attribute values of its DOM elements. We extend a CSS parser [90] to process CSS and overwrite the
corresponding selectors. The URL resource path randomization is implemented with initi-
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Figure 3.15.: Top banner ad on www.yahoo.com is blocked. Left: no Adblok. Right: with
Adblock. The distance score of the two screenshots is 4.75.

ating ajax requests on the client. We also implement a php program on the server side to
intercept the ajax requests.

3.4.2

Ad Blocking Evasion

To study the effects of WebRanz on preventing Ad blocking, we run WebRanz on real
world web pages. We randomly collected the home pages of 1426 websites from Alexa
top 10,000 list. In particular, we gather HTML, JavaScript and CSS ﬁles of each home
page. We ﬁrst remove duplicated websites hosted under different country domains (53).
For example, google.de is removed because google.com is in the dataset. We further
exclude those home pages that do not contain ads, the urls are obsolete, and those that incur
connection reset error (1152). Finally, 221 unique web pages are obtained. We host these
web pages on our own web server where we run WebRanz and perform randomizations.
Ad blocking software deletes Ads and the screen area used to place ads is taken by
surrounding content. Therefore, Ad blocking software changes visual appearances of webpage that contains Ads. Fig.3.15 shows the homepage of www.yahoo.com without and
with Adblocker. On the left snapshot (without Adblocker), the top area marked by the red
circle is a banner Ad. On the right snapshot (with Adblocker), the Ad space is removed and
all contents underneath the Ad is moving upward. To study the effectiveness of WebRanz,
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we compare the visual appearances of a web page in different settings. In particular, we
developed a program using Selenium [91]. It automatically installs Adblock Plus 1.9 on a
Firefox browser and drives the browser to visit the home pages hosted on our server with
and without WebRanz enabled. For each visit, we took a snapshot and stored the image. To
get a baseline for visual comparison, we also captured the snapshots of home pages with
both Adblock and WebRanz disabled. In this way, we have snapshots taken in three different settings. For each web page, we measure the visual differences of its snapshots. More
speciﬁcally, we compute the the distance between snapshots using an image comparison
algorithm in the Lucene Image Retrieval (LIRE) library [92].
As discussed in Section 3.3, web page randomization needs to be carried out on both
the web server and the client browser. Thus, we quantify the efﬁciency of our WebRanz on
both ends. In particular, we measure the latency of mutating DOM elements on the web
server as well as the latency introduced by the interception of Ad rendering.

Effectiveness
Table 3.4 demonstrates 50 randomly selected web pages (from the aforementioned 221
web pages with Ads) and the distance measures between their snapshots. Fig. 3.16 shows
the average distance measures between snapshots across the 221 web pages. As is shown in
the ﬁgure, we observed an average visual deviation of 3.828 on a web page before and after
Ad blocker is enabled. Note that 3.828 suggests substantial visual differences. Fig. 3.15
presents two images (with and without Adblock Plus) with the distance of 4.75.
Table 3.4.: Results for 50 randomly selected web pages.

Web Page

Orig vs.

Orig vs.

Page

Random-

Orig +

Rand +

Load

ization

Adblock

Adblock Time(s)

Overhead

Time(s)

www.autotrader.com

1.22

0.6

7.58

0.72

9.50%

www.capital.gr

1.15

0

8.85

0.45

5.08%
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www.celebritynetworth.com

5.37

0.58

12.1

0.252

2.08%

www.christianpost.com

0.60

0

4.41

0.215

4.88%

21.34

0.49

5.49

0.346

6.30%

www.dostor.org

1.33

0

3.91

0.222

5.68%

www.espnfc.us

2.19

0

6.63

0.765

11.54%

www.goodreads.com

0.73

0

5.31

0.433

8.15%

www.groupon.com

0.44

0

4.15

0.269

6.48%

www.haber7.com

6.97

0.61

7.27

0.306

4.21%

www.head-ﬁ.org

4.67

0

7.34

0.589

8.02%

www.hqrevshare.com

2.00

0

4.69

0.166

3.54%

www.hufﬁngtonpost.co.uk

2.74

0.57

11.99

0.99

8.26%

www.lotterypost.com

4.88

0

4.36

0.176

4.04%

www.marktplaats.nl

3.36

0

3.65

0.337

9.23%

www.mery.jp

0.72

0

5.18

0.445

8.59%

www.meteofrance.com

6.70

0

6.39

0.401

6.28%

www.microcenter.com

4.71

0

5.80

0.280

4.83%

www.mobile01.com

1.82

0

3.08

0.128

4.16%

www.much.com

2.53

0

7.36

0.481

6.53%

www.myanimelist.net

2.67

0

8.93

0.314

3.52%

www.niuche.com

0.59

0

8.9

0.168

1.89%

www.nk.pl

5.05

0

7.18

0.332

4.62%

www.nytimes.com

0.65

0

6.95

0.495

7.12%

www.olx.co.id

6.52

0

3.66

0.351

9.59%

www.phys.org

2.86

0

12.31

0.19

1.54%

www.popmaster.ir

3.57

0

8.48

0.243

2.87%

www.posta.com.tr

6.15

0

18.28

0.221

1.21%

www.prothom-alo.com

2.99

0

8.53

0.674

7.90%

www.qz.com

3.41

0

4.91

0.246

5.01%

www.classiccars.com

61

www.reclameaqui.com.br

5.48

0

3.71

0.423

11.40%

www.sabq.org

7.35

0

2.5

0.198

7.92%

www.setn.com

7.32

0.51

9.64

0.196

2.03%

www.shufoo.net

1.64

0

5.57

0.214

3.83%

www.siteprice.org

6.25

0

4.85

0.195

4.03%

www.smartinf.ru

15.88

0

2.35

0.082

3.49%

www.softonic.com

3.66

0

10.14

0.424

4.18%

www.southcn.com

1.53

0

6.65

0.21

3.16%

www.stcatharinesstandard.ca

8.18

0

21.23

0.453

2.13%

www.subscene.com

1.16

0

2.03

0.109

5.37%

www.theepochtimes.com

4.75

0

13.33

0.378

2.84%

www.u-car.com.tw

4.66

0.51

6.78

0.238

3.51%

www.torrenthound.com

1.21

0

3.9

0.082

2.10%

www.trend.az

0.97

0

5.04

0.177

3.51%

www.uol.com.br

1.66

0

11.32

0.41

3.62%

www.vietq.vn

2.13

0

7.36

0.199

2.70%

www.weeb.tv

6.27

0

3.97

0.089

2.24%

www.wmaraci.com

1.36

0

2.23

0.157

7.04%

www.wral.com

4.73

0.58

12.26

0.525

4.28%

www.yahoo.com

4.75

0

4.2

0.348

8.29%

Observe that after a web page is randomized, Table 3.4 and Fig. 3.16 illustrate a signiﬁcant drop of the visual deviation. In Table 3.4, we noted many distance scores between
snapshots drop to zero after the web pages are randomized. This indicates that WebRanz
can effectively prevent ad blocking software, display Ads to end users and preserve the
visual layout of the original web pages. For those non-zero distance scores after randomization, we manually examine the corresponding web pages. We found their visual differences result from CSS and JavaScript. In particular, we noted that some web pages employ
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Figure 3.16.: The average distance between snapshots. The average distance between original page and the page with Adblock is 3.828. The average distance between the original
page and the randomized page with Adblock is 0.834. The standard deviations are 3.258
and 1.391 respectively.

Figure 3.17.: Distance score is affected by sliding panels on www.u-car.com.tw. Left: no
Adblok. Right: after randomization with Adblock. The distance score of the two snapshots
is 0.516.

publicly available JavaScript and CSS library (e.g., YUI [93]) to develop animation such
as sliding panels whose dynamics introduce the slight differences between snapshots. As a
result, the non-zero distance scores do not suggest the failure of WebRanz. Fig. 3.17 shows
a typical example for the differences between an original page (without Adblock) and the
randomized page (with Adblock). Observe that all Ads are unblocked in both images. The

Randomization Time (Seconds)
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Figure 3.18.: Randomization latency vs. page size.
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Figure 3.19.: Page load latency before (avg:1.878, std:4.645) and after (avg:1.904,
std:5.149) randomization.

differences are caused by that the JavaScript in the page decided to display different Ad
contents in the two loadings. We suspect that a faithful replay technique that can get rid of
non-determinism should be able to generate a distance score close to 0.
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Efﬁciency
Fig. 3.19 illustrates the average latency of rendering a webpage before and after web
page randomization. For each page, we load it 10 times and take the average. As shown
in the ﬁgure, a web browser takes longer time to render a webpage when it is randomized
because (1) page randomization introduces additional JavaScript and the browser needs
to take extra time to parse and render the code; (2) randomization needs to intercept Ad
rendering on the ﬂy. As the code size of additional JavaScript is small and the interception
is lightweight, the overhead of rendering a randomized web page is negligible (1.38%).
Besides, although loading dynamic contents introduces deviations in page loading time, it
affects the overhead in a much smaller scale.
Table 3.4 shows the randomization latency introduced on the server side. On average,
this randomization latency is 235 milliseconds. As this latency inﬂuences the response to
page requests, we compare this latency with the page response time. Table 3.4 (column
overhead) shows the overhead of page response. On average, server side randomization
introduces negligible overhead to web page response (4.76%).
Finally, we also investigate the relation between server side randomization and the size
of web page. As shown in Fig. 3.18, the randomization latency is dependent upon the size
of webpage because WebRanz needs to mutate the attributes of DOM elements. A larger
web page may contain more DOM elements and thus WebRanz needs to take more time to
parse content.

3.4.3

Web Bot Prevention

Next we investigate how WebRanz beneﬁts the defense against web bots. From opensource projects, we selected 8 representative unwanted bots targeted at popular sites. We
summarize these bots in Table 3.5. Column Web Libraries indicates the utilities that a bot
relies on. Column Type represents the way that a bot locates a DOM element. Column LOC
describes the code size.
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Table 3.5.: Characteristics of content-sensitive bots.
Bot
[82]
[94]
[94]
[95]
[96]
[97]
[98]
[99]

Target
Lenovo Outlet
Google Search
Google Search
Yelp
Amazon
Twitter
NewEgg
Groupon

Web Libraries
urllib, webbrowser
Selenium
BeautifulSoup
BeautifulSoup
—
BeautifulSoup, Selenium
BeautifulSoup
BeautifulSoup

Type
regex matching
element selector
element selector
element selector
regex matching
element selector
element selector
element selector

LOC
348
517
3066
266
250
277
215
106

Table 3.6.: Results on the original and randomized page.
Target
Lenovo Outlet
Google Search
Google Search
Yelp
Amazon
Twitter
NewEgg
Groupon

Succeed?
Orig Rand
p
⇥
p
⇥
p
⇥
p
⇥
p
⇥
p
⇥
p
⇥
p
⇥

Look-ups
Total Passed
8
4
2
0
2
0
27
0
10
1
18
5
9
1
6
0

Reason
class
class
id
class
class
class
class
class

We run the bots on both the original and the randomized versions of the target pages.
Table 3.6 summarizes our ﬁndings. Succeed? shows whether a script can accomplish its
task. To understand why a script fails on the randomized version, we identify the shortest
execution path to complete a task. We then count the number of critical element look-ups
(i.e. that cannot be circumvented) and the number of successful look-ups before failing
along the path. We present the numbers in Look-ups: Total means the total number of
look-ups; Passed means the number of look-ups working correctly. Finally, Reason shows
why the pattern fails.
As shown in the result, all content-sensitive bots are broken on the pages after randomization. Almost all failed at a very early stage except one that ﬁnished 50% of the look-ups.
The results show that id and class are important selectors. Randomizing their values is an
effective countermeasure against web bots. Note that some look-ups succeeded because
the selectors used are very general (e.g. “url:*”).
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3.4.4

Limitations

Our experiments show the effectiveness of WebRanz. We argue that it helps maintaining the health of web ecosystem. However, it is merely one step towards our ultimate goal
of constituting a fair and sustainable Ad delivery mechanism and preventing web bots. It
has the following limitations.
First, WebRanz is not intended to distinguish legitimate Ads from the unsolicited ones.
For example, Adware may leverage WebRanz to circumvent ad blockers. We argue this is
an orthogonal challenge beyond the scope of the chapter.
Second, to preserve web page appearances and functionalities, WebRanz has to send
the mappings (from the original attributes to their randomized versions) and JavaScript
code that performs the runtime de-randomization to the client side. In other words, they are
accessible by the ad blockers and web bots, and theoretically can be reverse engineered and
circumvented. However, we argue that reverse engineering WebRanz is impractical because
the mappings and the de-randomization logic are also randomized and encrypted differently
each time a page is loaded. As such, reverse engineering can hardly be automated. Even if
reverse engineering may occasionally succeed, the information becomes useless when the
page is loaded another time.
Third, ad blockers and web bots may inject in-page script to probe the mappings on
the ﬂy or simply reuse the instrumented APIs. For example, to apply an element hiding
rule, Adblock can inject in-page script to invoke the instrumented APIs which translate the
ids and classes in the rules to the randomized versions. However, since Adblock does not
know which rules may apply for a given page, it has to test each rule, which is prohibitively
expensive (due to the sheer volume of the rules). The resulting user experience degradation
would easily force the end user to uninstall Adblock.
Fourth, WebRanz cannot block web bots if they only use general rules, even though this
does not happen in the real world according to our experience.
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3.5

Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, the line of work most closely related to ours is anti-

adblocker solutions [76–78]. They exploit the power of in-page JavaScript to identify ad
blocker installers and then demand them turn off their ad blockers or subscribe to paywalls.
Unlike existing anti-adblockers, which aim to discover and lock down ad blocker installers,
WebRanz helps websites deliver the originally-intended ads by preventing ad blockers from
expunging them.
Another relevant work is PolyRef, a polymorphic defense against automated attacks
on the web [100]. PolyRef utilizes polymorphism to dynamically reshape sensitive page
content and thus impede certain class of automated attacks. Different from WebRanz that
randomizes DOM attributes and overwrites native JavaScript APIs for the purpose of handling dependency between JavaScript and HTML, PolyRef achieves web content randomization by directly reshaping DOM attributes and at the same time updating corresponding
JavaScript because they assume there is no dependency between third-party JavaScript and
obfuscated DOM attributes. Ads on webpages are tied to third-party JavaScript. As a result,
PolyRef cannot be general and applied to the context of ad blocking. In addition, PolyRef
only reshape sensitive web content typically resistant to JavaScript dynamics. Thus, it
could ensure partially obfuscated webpage functional even though neglecting to deal with
JavaScript dynamics. Ads are typically rendered by dynamic JavaScript and failure to deal
with JavaScript dynamics could make obfuscated webpages dysfunctional. Consequently,
PolyRef is unlikely to be effective against ad blocking.
Last but not least, our work is also relevant to the research in moving target defenses
in web applications [101–103]. To defend Cross-Site Scripting attacks, Portner et al. [102]
mutate JavaScript lexical rules uniquely for different users. Taguinod et al. [103] propose
to change the underlying language implementation of the web application with the goal
of preventing certain categories of vulnerabilities from being effectively exploited. However, these two solutions [102, 103] need system modiﬁcations which are not practical for
circumventing ad blocking software. NOMAD [101] targets at preventing web bots from

68
imitating a real user’s actions of submitting an HTML form. It randomizes HTML form
element parameters in each session but does not handle HTML loaded dynamically. Therefore, this technique does not apply to bypassing ad blockers.
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4

ARROW: AUTOMATED REPAIR OF RACES ON CLIENT-SIDE
WEB PAGES

Modern browsers have a highly concurrent page rendering process in order to be more responsive. However, such a concurrent execution model leads to various race issues. In
this chapter, we present ARROW, a static technique that can automatically, safely, and cost
effectively patch certain race issues on client side pages. It works by statically modeling a
web page as a causal graph denoting happens-before relations between page elements, according to the rendering process in browsers. Races are detected by identifying inconsistencies between the graph and the dependence relations intended by the developer. Detected
races are ﬁxed by leveraging a constraint solver to add a set of edges with the minimum
cost to the causal graph so that it is consistent with the intended dependences. The input
page is then transformed to respect the repair edges. ARROW has ﬁxed 151 races from 20
real world commercial web sites.

4.1

Introduction
Web applications are pervasive, providing the platform for many daily activities such

as shopping, social networking, gaming and working. To satisfy increasingly complex
functional requirements and provide pleasant user experience, they often include complex
logics in client-side pages. According to a survey on 4.2 billion web pages conducted by
Google in 2010 [104], on average, each page includes 7.09 external JavaScript (JS) ﬁles.
The average size of external JS ﬁles per page is 57.98KB. A web page takes up to 114.25KB
on average, excluding images.
Client-side web pages contain multiple types of scripts such as Stylesheets, HTML,
and JS. In order to be highly responsive, these pages are rendered by modern browsers in a
concurrent fashion. When a web page is rendered, some of the included external resources
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are downloaded, assembled and rendered asynchronously. User input events and internal
events indicating the status of various asynchronous tasks ﬁre in a non-deterministic order,
due to various factors such as network delay. Some execution orders may be signiﬁcantly
different from the developer’s intention, leading to exceptions. We call them web application races. These races are wide-spread and can cause serious problems. According
to [4], developers in Mozilla have observed that many web sites used in their regression
suite failed non-deterministically due to races. They crashed the JS engine, caused session
data loss, or corrupted services such as the Hotmail email service. For example, a race that
crashes the JS engine or triggers page reloading in the middle of email composition may
cause a loss of the unﬁnished email. Races during business transactions may have unexpected ﬁnancial consequences. According to [105], client side races may lead to permanent
data corruption on the server side such as online photos being undesirably deleted. Exceptions during gaming or Internet surﬁng lead to poor user experience, causing the service
providers to lose their customers as popular services often have many competitors.
In this section, we propose ARROW1 , a technique that can automatically ﬁx races on
client side pages based on static analysis. Given a page, it ﬁrst statically analyzes the page
to detect races. It then transforms the page by re-ordering the elements in the page (e.g. JS
code blocks) or adding customized synchronizations. To reason about the complex effects
of element reordering and adding synchronization, and to ensure the repairs for multiple
races do not have undesirable interferences, we leverage constraint solving. In particular,
we model the page into a causal graph describing the happens-before relations between
elements, which is further encoded to constraints. We then infer the dependences between
elements intended by the developer from the page source. The solver is queried to detect
any inconsistencies between the happens-before relations and the dependences, which are
essentially races. The constraints are constructed in such a way that we can further query
if a smallest set of causal edges can be added to the graph so that all the races in the
same page can be repaired together in a safe fashion. If so, the page is transformed to
respect those edges. Since different transformations (e.g. element reordering and adding
1 ARROW

stands for “Automated Repair of Races On client-side Web pages”.
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synchronizations) have different runtime cost, we also encode the estimated cost as part of
the constraints such that the repair with the lowest estimated cost can be identiﬁed.
ARROW has the following advantages: (a) it is automatic; (b) it is safe, meaning the
repairs will not add any new buggy behavior as our analysis is conservative; (c) it delivers
cost-effective solutions.
Our main contributions are the following.
• We propose a technique ARROW that can automatically ﬁx certain races on client
side pages.

• We develop a technique to detect races statically by identifying inconsistencies between happens-before relations determined by the page rendering order and the dependences extracted from the page source, denoting the developer’s intension of the
execution order.
• We develop a constraint solving based repair scheme that can ensure safety and
achieve low runtime cost.

• We evaluate ARROW on 20 real world websites. It detects and repairs 151 races
correctly.

Since ARROW aims to repair races in a page for all possible input scenarios and ensure
safety, it is built on static analysis. Note that a dynamic analysis based repair technique
may ﬁx the page for one input but introduce undesirable effects (e.g. deadlock) for a
diferent input. Static analysis has limitations on handling dynamic web features, such
as runtime element insertion. As such, ARROW detects and repairs a subset of races that
are amenable to static analysis. More discussion can be found in Section 4.3.6. Handling
dynamic features [106, 107] is part of our future work.

72
<!ͲͲmain.htmlͲͲ>
01<iframesrc=“a.html”>
02<iframesrc=“b.html”>
<!ͲͲa.htmlͲͲ>
03<script>parent.x=1;</script>
<!ͲͲb.htmlͲͲ>
<script>
04alert(parent.x);
</script>

<!ͲͲb.html(fixed)ͲͲ>
<script>
104functionfoo_1(){
105if(parent.x!=undefined){
106alert(parent.x);
107}else{
108setTimeout(foo_1,st);
109}
110}
111foo_1();
</script>

(a)RaceonJSVariables

(c)Fixedb.html

iframe
b.html

iframe
a.html

b.html
alert(...x)

a.html
...x=1

(b)APossibleLoadingSequence

Figure 4.1.: (a) shows a race resulting in accessing an uninitialized variable “x” in line
4. (b) demonstrates the buggy execution. (c) shows the script after repair. The boxed
statements are added during repair.

4.2

Motivation

4.2.1

Accessing Unready Objects

Web pages usually include multiple external resources such as JS, CSS, and images.
During page loading, web browsers aggressively process resources whenever they become
available. Although the loading order usually follows the source code order, due to unpredictable reasons such as browser settings, network conditions and user interactions, it
may become different from the source code order. Sometimes, such differences represent
race conditions that result in accessing DOM elements or JS objects before they are ready.
Accessing unready objects is an important kind of race conditions reported by existing race
detection work [4]: three out of four races reported fall into this category. Next we show
such an example and illustrate its repair.
Figure 4.1(a) presents a page main.html that includes a.html and b.html using two iframe
tags. Suggested by the inclusion order, a.html is supposed to be processed before b.html so
that the use of variable x at line 4 will happen after its deﬁnition at line 3. However, iframes
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are loaded asynchronously. As a result, the sequence in Figure 4.1(b) can be the actual one,
where b.html is processed before a.html. Therefore, the access to “x” at line 4 refers to
an undeﬁned variable and causes exception. Note that such exceptions often trigger page
reloading that may cause loss of user’s session inputs.
To ﬁx this issue, we leverage the deﬁnition-use (def-use) dependence suggested by the
source code order and force the execution to follow an order that respects the dependence,
by introducing customized synchronization. In particular, for a variable in a race, we check
its availability before the use to make sure it is ready. If not, we wait and try again after
some time until it’s ready. As shown in Figure 4.1(c), the boxed statements are added
to enforce the execution order. The access at 106 is wrapped by a new function foo 1().
Before accessing variable x, we check if it is ready at line 105. If not, we set up a timer
at line 108 and try again after st (a predeﬁned number) milliseconds. Note that the timer
only ﬁres once and it may be setup again by the handler foo 1() if needed. The availability
check serves as the customized synchronization and makes sure x is always ready when
accessed. Note that since JS does not provide native synchronization support, continuous
polling controlled by a timer is a common approach for developers to manually ﬁx race
issues in practice [108].
Besides JS variables, race conditions can also happen on HTML DOM elements or JS
function objects. We can repair them in a similar way.

4.2.2

One-Time Handlers

Another common kind of races is related to event handlers. For example, an onload
event ﬁres only once after a DOM element is loaded. Onload handlers are important as
developers usually use them to initialize the properties of the corresponding DOM object.
If an onload event handler is not invoked correctly, the page may become unusable.
By default, the onload handler of a DOM object is empty. Developers can explicitly
register a JS function as the new handler. Although it is possible to specify the handler at
the place where a DOM object is deﬁned (e.g., <img onload=“foo()”>), developers tend
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<!ͲͲmain.htmlͲͲ>
01<imgid=“ii”...>
……
<script>
02functioninitA(...){
[...some_stmts...]
}
03varimg1=
document.getElementById(“ii”);
04img1.onload=initA();
…...
</script>

<!ͲͲmain.html(fixed)ͲͲ>
<script>
101functioninitA(...){
[...some_stmts...]
}
</script>
102<imgid=“ii”onload=”initA(...)”...>
<script>
103varimg1=
document.getElementById(“ii”);
04img1.onload=initA();
</script>

D 2ULJLQDO6FULSW
img
parsed

F )L[HG9HUVLRQ

imgonload
eventfires

initA()
parsed

setinitA()asimg’s
onloadhandler

E %XJJ\([HFXWLRQ

Figure 4.2.: Race condition on an event handler that is triggered only once and the corresponding repair.

to register event handlers explicitly and separately using JS. This is especially true when
programming with third-party libraries. Figure 4.2(a) shows an example. At line 1, an
image object, <img>, is deﬁned. At line 3, the script gets a reference to this object and
registers a JS function, initA(), as its onload event handler.
One reason behind such a practice is to make page loading faster by parallelizing remote resource downloading and local script interpretation. If a browser handles everything
sequentially, it is less efﬁcient since it has to wait until the ﬁles requested are retrieved
from the remote servers. Therefore, in modern browsers, external resource downloads are
usually asynchronous and non-blocking. In this example, when the browser encounters
the <img> tag, it requests the image ﬁle speciﬁed by the src attribute and starts the asynchronous download. Then it proceeds to the following HTML elements. Once the <img>
is fully loaded, its onload event ﬁres. Since parsing local script is usually faster than downloading a remote ﬁle, in most cases the event handler registration at line 4 can be done
before the onload event ﬁres so that the handler can be invoked correctly.
However, the order between the handler registration (line 4) and the onload event ﬁring
(i.e. the moment when the <img> element at line 1 is fully loaded) is nondeterministic. If
the image requested is small or cached locally, it is possible the onload event ﬁres before its
handler is registered. If so, the onload event handler may never be invoked. For example,
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Figure 4.2(b) shows a buggy execution sequence. When the onload event of <img> ﬁres,
function initA() has not been registered yet so that it will never have a chance to be executed.
Note that unlike events that can be triggered multiple times, an onload event will only ﬁre
once. We call an event handler of this kind a one-time handler.
Figure 4.2(c) shows its repair. Since developers cannot control when the onload event
ﬁres, to make sure the event handler is registered and triggered properly, we place the
registration to the deﬁnition point of the DOM object. In this example, lines 1 and 3 are
replaced by line 102. Then, we move the declaration of function initA() before the <img>
tag so that initA() is deﬁned before it is used.
The repair in this example is different from the one in Figure 4.1(c). In Figure 4.1(c),
we introduce customized synchronization to enforce the appropriate load order. While the
race in this example can also be ﬁxed similarly, we choose to reorder elements in the web
page. We change the places where initA() is declared and registered. The goal is to avoid
additional runtime overhead introduced by synchronization.
Observe that the races are due to inconsistencies between the execution order and the
def-use order in both cases. We ﬁx them by transforming the page so the orders become
consistent. In this chapter, we focus on this kind of race problems.
In practice, similar issues have been observed. For example, according to [109, 110],
races are the root causes of malfunctioned user interfaces and incomplete page loading,
leading to unusable web pages. Fixing real world web application races is challenging. In
particular, there are inter-dependencies between DOM objects and JS variables such that
the developers have to be very cautious in re-positioning elements and adding synchronizations. For example, moving a piece of JS code forward may break existing def-use
dependences and introduce uninitialized variable access errors. Adding synchronizations
may introduce deadlocks. Furthermore, a client page often has multiple races. Their repairs
may interfere with each other and have consequences that are difﬁcult to reason about. Finally, since there are alternatives in ﬁxing a race, constructing a low-cost overall repair (for
multiple races) is a complex optimization problem difﬁcult to address manually.
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Figure 4.3.: ARROW overview.

Therefore, one key contribution of our work is to model the problem of automatically
ﬁxing multiple races in a web page together as a constraint solving problem, and leverage
the solver to ensure that (1) our ﬁxes do not break any existing semantics (and hence introduce new bugs); (2) ﬁxes do not interfere in ways leading to any undesirable consequences;
(3) and the overall repair plan is cost-effective.

4.3

Design
In this section, we ﬁrst present a high-level overview of ARROW. Then, we discuss the

design of the individual components in more details in Sections 4.3.2 - 4.3.4.

4.3.1

Overview and Deployment

As shown in Figure 4.3, the input of ARROW is a client-side web page and the output
is the ﬁxed version of the page. The work-ﬂow of ARROW can be divided into three steps:
In the ﬁrst step, we perform static analysis on the HTML and the JS snippets included
in the input page. We construct a causal graph that models the happens-before relations
between runtime events of page elements (e.g., DOM object creation must happen before
the invocations of its event handlers). These relations are determined by the underlying
page parsing and execution model of modern browsers, which will be discussed in Section 4.3.2. We also identify all the def-use dependences that describe the deﬁnition(s) that a
use of variable/object may come from. Def-use relations are different from happens-before
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orders. They are derived from the source code order in the given page, reﬂecting the developer’s original expectation of the execution order. However, the orders suggested by
def-use relations are not necessarily respected by the happens-before relations, leading to
races. The graph and the def-use relations allow us to reduce the original problem to a partial order reasoning problem. In particular, we detect races by identifying inconsistencies
between the causal graph and the def-use relations and we repair races by transforming the
causal graph (and hence transforming the page) to respect the def-use relations. In this step,
we also produce a DOM tree and JS ASTs that will be used in the repair step. More details
can be found in Section 4.3.2.
In the second step, we detect races by identifying inconsistencies between the causal
graph and the def-use relations derived from the source code order, as illustrated by the examples in Section 4.2. In particular, we model this problem as determining the reachability
from an object/variable deﬁnition to its use in the causal graph, leveraging a constraint
solver. We encode the directed edges in the causal graph and the orders suggested by defuse relations as constraints. Then, we feed the constraints to a solver and query satisﬁability
for several purposes:
(a) Race detection. Assuming the happens-before relations in the graph, we check
whether the orders suggested by individual def-use pairs are respected. If not, races
are detected.
(b) The existence of a repair. After races are detected, we check whether the race inducing execution orders can be precluded by introducing additional causal edges. If yes,
we say the input page is ﬁxable.
(c) An optimal repair. The solution produced in the previous query may not be an optimal repair. For example, assume both element reordering and customized synchronizations can ﬁx a race. However, as mentioned before, element reordering
has less runtime overhead compared to customized synchronizations. Therefore, reordering is a better repair if it is applicable. On the other hand, reordering is more
likely to break existing semantic constraints (e.g. def-use relations) and becomes in-
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applicable. To ﬁnd a cost-effective solution, we further associate costs for the two
repair options. By asserting a speciﬁc cost goal to the constraint solver, starting from
a low cost and gradually increasing, we are able to ﬁnd a repair with the lowest cost.
We explain the details of this step in Section 4.3.3.
In the third step, we transform the page according to the repair, which is essentially a
set of additional causal edges in the graph. In particular, elements are reordered or customized synchronizations are introduced according to the edges. The repair will preserve
the original looks and functionalities of the page. Section 4.3.4 explains how to transform
the input web page based on the repair solution generated in the previous step.
Deployment. Due to the overhead of constraint solving, ARROW is not suitable for onthe-ﬂy bug repair on the client side. We anticipate the following two possible ways of
deploying ARROW.
First, during in-house testing and debugging, ARROW can aid developers in ﬁxing
races. Note ARROW only ﬁxes races in a client page, which may be dynamically generated
from a server script. ARROW currently does not ﬁx server scripts. Instead, it will provide
the ﬁxed client pages to the developers who will integrate the ﬁxes to the server scripts.
Second, ARROW may be used to protect against races during production runs when
used with page caches. When a page is downloaded, ARROW performs analysis and repair
in the background and then replaces the cached page with the ﬁxed version such that it can
prevent future races.

4.3.2

Causal Graph Construction and Def-Use Relation Identiﬁcation

In step one, ARROW constructs a causal graph to model the happens-before orders of
events based on the standard page parsing and execution order of modern browsers.
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Figure 4.4.: Location precedence. “⇤ ” in (c) means l2 < l1 holds if l2 is not included by an
iframe or an async script.

Web Page Rendering Process
While modern browsers are highly concurrent, they still strictly follow certain orders
during page rendering. Understanding these orders is critical to causal graph construction.
Given a page, the browser parses the page in the source code order. Once a DOM object is parsed, it is created and its onload event ﬁres. For DOM objects whose creation
relies on remote resources (e.g., an image with a remote URL), the browser requests the
resource in a non-blocking mode and proceeds to render the remainder of the page. Some
browsers will not create the DOM object until the remote resource is successfully retrieved.
The browser also parses and executes JS code snippets following their location order in the
page. Statements within a pair of <script> and </script> are parsed and executed atomically. In other words, they cannot interleave with others. The page may explicitly declare
asynchronous artifacts such as iframes and asynchronous scripts, whose executions are
non-deterministic and decoupled from their parsing and creation. Event handler executions
are mostly non-deterministic, depending on the event triggering time, except onload events.
From the page rendering process discussed above, we can observe that the source code
location order of elements is very important. We model it through a relation called script location precedence. Given two different source locations l1 and l2 in a web page or external
resources included, we deﬁne location precede (denoted as “<”) as follows.
(1) l1 and l2 are in a same ﬁle. As shown in Figure 4.4(a), if l1 appears before l2 , l1 < l2 .
(2) l1 and l2 are in different ﬁles. If there exists l3 such that l1 and l3 are in the same ﬁle,
and l2 is transitively included at l3 , there are two cases as follows:
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• If l1 < l3 (Figure 4.4(b)), l1 < l2 . In this case, before the browser sees the tag at l3
and goes into the inclusion chain, the elements at l1 must have been processed.

• If l3 < l1 and l2 is not included by an iframe or an asynchronous script (Figure 4.4(c)),
l2 < l1 . Otherwise, l1 ⌅ l2 ^ l2 ⌅ l1 . In this scenario, the browser sees the tag at l3

before l1 . The order between l1 and l2 depends on whether the inclusion chain is processed sequentially: If so, the browser must process l2 before l1 . Otherwise, when l2
is included in an iframe or an asynchronous script, l2 will be handled asynchronously
so that the order between them is nondeterministic.

Causal Graph
Since our repairs need to be safe (i.e. not introducing any new bugs but rather just
precluding problematic execution orders in the original page), we make use of conservative
static analysis in graph construction.
The causal graph of a web page is a directed graph CG = (N, E [ W). N is a set

of nodes that represent runtime events during page parsing and rendering such as DOM
creations and event handler invocations. E and W denote two kinds of happens-before
edges between nodes.
Nodes. We model the following ﬁve kinds of nodes.
(N1) We use D to denote the set of HTML elements. If d 2 D is declared and created at
location l, create(d, l) 2 N.

(N2) Let o be a global JS object, such as a global variable or a function, declared at l,
create(o, l) 2 N.
(N3) Let s be a top level statement (i.e. a statement not in any function or composite
statement such as conditional or loop) parsed and executed at location l, exec(s, l) 2

N. Note that although all statements in a JS code block execute atomically, we create
nodes for individual top level statements so that we can separate a code block to
multiple smaller blocks and reorder them. These nodes are different from the nodes in
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(N2) as a function may be declared but not invoked. We do not represent lower level
statements as reordering them or adding synchronizations to them is very difﬁcult
and also unnecessary in most cases. We can ensure orders of low level statements by
enforcing orders of their corresponding top level statements.
(N4) Let f be a function registered as the handler of an event e of object d 2 D, the
invocation of the handler handler( f , d, e) 2 N. For instance, handler( f , d, onlo ad)
denotes the invocation of the onload handler of d.

(N5) Let a be an asynchronous external JS element declared at l (e.g. <script async
src=...>). Its declaration create(a, l) 2 N and the asynchronous execution or in-

terpretation interpr(a) 2 N.

During page loading, the browser parses and renders/executes HTML and JS objects
sequentially according to the location order. The invocations of onload event handlers of
DOM objects are hence also sequential. We call nodes involved in sequential processing
sequential nodes. They include the nodes tagged with location label l (e.g., N1, N2, N3).
In contrast, other nodes represent executions of asynchronous scripts or callbacks triggered
by user or timer events. We call them asynchronous nodes. A special case is that the
invocation of an iframe’s onload event handler is treated as an asynchronous node.
Edges. E is the set of directed edges indicating irreversible happens-before relations between nodes. We classify happens-before relations into two kinds: reversible and irreversible. Irreversible edges. Edges cannot be transformed during repair such as the order
between DOM object creation events because mutating such edges may lead to undesirable
visual differences in page rendering. In contrast, some happens-before relations such as the
order between a DOM object creation and a JS object creation may be reversed.
For any two nodes n1 and n2 , (n1 , n2 ) 2 E if any of the following conditions holds.
(E1) n1 = create(d1 , l1 ), n2 = create(d2 , l2 ), where d1 , d2 2 D, l1 < l2 , @ create(d3 , l3 ) 2 N

such that d3 2 D and l1 < l3 < l2 . It means the orders between static DOM elements
are irreversible so that they will be preserved in the repair.
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(E2) n1 = create(a, l), n2 = interpr(a), where a is an asynchronous external JS element.
(E3) n1 = create(d, l), n2 = handler( f , d, e). The creation of DOM element d happens
before the invocation of a handler of event e of the element.
(E4) n1 = handler( f1 , d1 , onload), n2 = handler( f2 , d2 , on load), d2 encloses d1 .
(E5) n1 = exec(ajaxS(d), l), n2 = handler( f , d, ajaxR). If a JS statement ajaxS(d) at l
creates an ajax object d, registers f as its response handler and sends the request,
ajaxS(d) executes before f .
(E6) n1 = exec(setTimeOut | setInterval, l), n2 = handler( f , , timer). Function setTime-

Out/setInterval registers f as a timer event handler. f can be invoked after its registration at l.

(E7) n1 = create(iframe(x),l1 ), n2 = create(d2 , l2 ) with d2 2 D the ﬁrst HTML element in
the iframe page x.

(E8) n1 = create(d, l1 ) | create(o, l1 ) | exec(s1 , l1 ) | create(a, l1 ), n2 = exec(s2 , l2 ), where
l1 < l2 and s2 denotes a method call that evaluates a string as JS (e.g., eval()). Func-

tion eval() may generate some script on the ﬂy that uses a variable deﬁned before
l2 so we do not want to reposition anything before l2 to after l2 . To handle this, we
prevent any reposition between a node preceding an eval() node and the eval() node,
by introducing these conservative irreversible edges. Note that this does not prevent
reordering of elements before the eval().
(E9) n1 = exec(s1 , l1 ), n2 = create(d, l2 ) | create(o, l2 ) | exec(s2 , l2 ) | create(a, l2 ), where
l1 < l2 and s1 evaluates a string as JS. This rule is symmetric to (E8), preventing

moving things after l1 to before l1 .
Note that (E5) and (E6) introduce causal edges between event handler registration and
invocation for Ajax responses and timer events, whereas such causality does not exist for
regular events such as onload and onclick. The reason is that regular events ﬁre even
without the explicit registration of handlers but Ajax responses and timer events do not.
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Reversible Edges. A separate relation set (W) is deﬁned to denote reversible edges. In
particular, W is a set of ordered pairs of sequential nodes in N satisfying one of the conditions.
(W1) n1 = create(d, l1 ) | create(o, l1 ) | create(a, l1 ), n2 = exec(s, l2 ). If l1 < l2 and there is
not another node with label l3 s.t. l1 < l3 and l3 < l2 , (n1 , n2 ) 2 W. If l2 < l1 and
there is not a node l3 s.t. l2 < l3 and l3 < l1 , (n2 , n1 ) 2 W.

(W2) n1 = exec(s1 , l1 ), n2 = exec(s2 , l2 ). If l1 < l2 and there is not a node l3 s.t. l1 < l3 and
l3 < l2 , (n1 , n2 ) 2 W.
Recall we only create nodes for top level statements (N3) so that the location order is also
the control ﬂow order in (W2). An edge between a script statement execution node with
any other node is a reversible edge, denoting that the script statement may be repositioned
during repair without causing visual differences. However, whether a reversible edge can
be really reversed is also determined by the def-use relations which we will discuss next.
Handling Dynamic Features. Rules (E8) and (E9) allow us handle eval() conservatively.
HTML pages can be modiﬁed at runtime by their own JS code. To handle this, ARROW
currently requires the developer to record the set of possible pages and apply the technique
to individual pages. As part of the deployment procedure (Section 4.3.1), the developer
may need to integrate the ﬁxes.

Def-Use Relation Identiﬁcation
The def-use relation (Pdu ) is a set of node pairs in CG. Particularly, (n1 , n2 )x 2 Pdu

means a JS global object/variable or a DOM element x is deﬁned in n1 and used in n2 .
Note that if n1 and n2 denote top level composite statements (e.g. conditionals or function
calls), deﬁnitions/uses inside n1 /n2 will introduce edges between n1 and n2 . Def-use pairs
are identiﬁed following the location order in the web page source. The essence is that the
source order reﬂects the original semantics intended by the developer, which may not be
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Figure 4.5.: The causal graph and the def-use pairs of the web pages shown in Figure 4.1(a) and
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“E” and “H” beside nodes denote the node types: object creations, JS executions and event handler
invocations, respectively.

respected by the process order in the browser, causing races. The deﬁnition is presented as
follows.
• Let n2 be a sequential node that uses a global DOM/JS object x. Based on the source
location order from the beginning to n2 , for any deﬁnition of x in n1 that can reach

n2 , (n1 , n2 )x 2 Pdu .
• Let n2 be an asynchronous node that uses x. If a node n1 deﬁnes x, (n1 , n2 )x 2 Pdu .
Example. The graphs in Figure 4.5 show the casual graphs with both reversible and irreversible edges, and the def-use pairs for the two examples in Section 4.2. In particular,
Figure 4.5(a) is for the ﬁrst example in Figure 4.1(a). Figure 4.5(b) models Figure 4.2(a).
In Figure 4.5(a), the causal edges are established by Rules (E1) and (E7). The def-use relation is straightforward. In Figure 4.5(b) the causal edges are introduced by Rules (E3),
(W1) and (W2).
Our def-use analysis is mostly standard, very similar to that in WALA [111]. The analysis distinguishes must def-use pairs (i.e., the use variable is a must alias of the deﬁnition
variable and there is a path between the deﬁnition and the use) from may def-use pairs (i.e.,
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the use variable is a may alias of the deﬁnition variable and there is a path between the
deﬁnition and the use). We use must-pairs in race detection to avoid false positives. We use
may-pairs in repair to ensure safety. More discussion is in Section 4.3.6.

4.3.3

Repair Generation: A Constraint Solving Based Approach

In this chapter, we consider ﬁxing races that manifest themselves as inconsistencies
between the page rendering order and the def-use pairs. As mentioned at the end of Section 4.2, the challenges of ﬁxing these races lie in avoiding breaking any existing semantic
constraints, reasoning about the interferences between individual ﬁxes, and achieving cost
effectiveness. We hence leverage constraint solving to construct a universal repair that ﬁx
all races together. Here a repair is essentially a set of new edges in the causal graph.
The overarching design is to encode causal graph edges including reversible and irreversible ones into relations. We also encode def-use pairs as a different relation. We then
query the solver if def-use pairs can be inferred from the edge relations. This is equivalent
to performing graph reachability analysis. If not, races are detected. We then further query
the solver if a smallest set of weighted edges can be added such that the def-use pairs can
be inferred in the mean time the added weight/cost is minimal.
Edge Encoding. We deﬁne a function hasEdge(B) to encode edges including those in both
E and W.
B: Node ⇥ Node ! Bool

The relation is populated by the edges from the causal graph. As suggested by the following theorem, B is irreﬂexive and asymmetric.
¬(n B n)

8n 2 N,

(n1 B n2 ) =) ¬(n2 B n1 )

8n1 , n2 2 N,

[1]

It is not transitive either. From n1 B n2 and n2 B n3 , we cannot infer n1 B n3 .
Inferring Happens-Before from hasEdge Relation.
Next, we introduce the happensBefore( ) relation as follows.

8n1 , n2 2 N, n1

: Node ⇥ Node ! Bool
n2

:=

n1 B n2

| 9n3 , n1

[2]
n3 ^ n3 B n2
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If there is a path between two nodes, there is a happens-before relation between them.
The relation has similar properties as the hasEdge relation, except that it is transitive,
as suggested by the following theorem.
8n 2 N,

8n1 , n2 2 N,

8n1 , n2 , n3 2 N,

¬(n
(n1
(n1

n)
n2 ) =) ¬(n2
n2 ^ n2

n1 )

n3 ) =) (n1

[3]
n3 )

Note that the theorem dictates the causal graph is acyclic.
Def-Use Pair Encoding. A def-use pair implies that the deﬁnition should happen before
the use. Therefore, we assert the happens-before relation between a deﬁnition and the
corresponding use. In particular, assume nu uses x; If n1 is the only place where x is
deﬁned, we assert n1
(n1

nu ) _ ... _ (ni

nu ; If nu may use multiple x from nodes {n1 , ..., ni }, we assert

nu ).

Repair Cost Encoding. We explicitly encode repair cost for two purposes: race detection
and cost-effective repair construction. Different from using relational reasoning engines
such as Datalog, it is tricky to determine if a given (def-use) pair is a member of a (happensbefore) relation using an SMT engine (during race detection). Given a def-use pair nd and
nu , if we assert nd

nu , the SMT engine will simply add the pair to the current happens-

before relation if it does not cause any contradiction. In other words, the solver will always
try to yield a satisﬁable result by simply adding causal edges. Therefore, we leverage the
cost encoding to address the issue.
We introduce a relation W denoting the set of node pairs that do not have an edge in
either direction. If (n1 , n2 ) 2 W, (n2 , n1 ) 2 W.

For two nodes (n1 , n2 ) 2 W, we deﬁne a function cost (n1 , n2 ) to denote the cost when

we introduce an additional edge from n1 to n2 . The value of cost(n1 , n2 ) is determined
using results from the previous analysis stage. In particular, if the order between n1 and

n2 can be inferred from their source locations and they are in a same ﬁle, they are eligible
for reordering. Note that if a node is asynchronous, the order cannot be inferred from the
source locations. Since reordering has less runtime overhead, we assign a small value 1
to cost(n1 , n2 ). Otherwise, introducing synchronizations is the only way to enforce their
order. Since it has more runtime overhead, we use a larger number 10 as the cost.
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We use Cn1 Bn2 to denote the repair cost regarding an edge from n1 to n2 . If an edge
from n1 to n2 is added in a repair, Cn1 Bn2 equals to cost(n1 , n2 ). Otherwise, Cn1 Bn2 equals
to 0. For any two nodes without edges in either direction, we encode their repair cost as
follows.
8(n1 , n2 ) 2 W, Cn1 Bn2 = (n1 B n2 ) ? cost(n1 , n2 ) : 0

We use Crepair to represent the total cost, which is computed as Crepair = Â(n1 ,n2 )2W Cn1 Bn2 .
Race Detection. To detect races, we encode the causal edges E [ W and def-use pairs as

mentioned before. For node pairs that do not have any edges (E [ W) in either direction,
we encode their cost of adding new edges.

We set the total repair cost (Crepair ) to 0 and query its satisﬁability, which essentially
checks whether the happens-before relations suggested by the def-use pairs can be satisﬁed
without introducing new edges. If the constraint is SAT, no race is detected. Otherwise,
there are race conditions.
Example. The encoding of Figure 4.5(a) is
(N1 B N2 ) ^ (N1 B N3 ) ^ (N2 B N4 ) ^ (N3

N4 )

^ ( if N3 B N4 then CN3 BN4 = 10 else CN3 BN4 = 0)
^ ( if N4 B N3 then CN4 BN3 = 10 else CN4 BN3 = 0)
^ ...
^ Crepair = (CN3 BN4 +CN4 BN3 ) + (CN1 BN4 +CN4 BN1 )
+ (CN2 BN3 +CN3 BN2 )
^ Crepair = 0
^ [1] ^ [2] ^ [3]

Note N3

N4 in the ﬁrst row is introduced according to the def-use pair on x. The encoding

for Figure 4.5(b) is similar.
Finding a Cost-Effective Repair. Next we generate a repair if we found races in the
previous step. A repair is a set of additional directed edges introduced to the causal graph
such that the relations implied by def-use pairs are consistent with the new happensBefore
relation.
We start by determining whether a repair exists. Unlike in race detection, this time we
only encode irreversible edges. The reason is that ignoring the reversible edges allows the
solver to explore reordering of the corresponding elements. We reuse the other constraint
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Figure 4.6.: Repairs for the two illustrative examples.

encodings from the previous step. This time, we do not restrict the repair cost, which can be
achieved by removing the assertion Crepair = 0. We query the solver again. If the constraint
is SAT, a repair exists. The solution provided by the solver will report the additional edges
needed. It will also report a concrete value for repair cost Crepair . Assume its value is k. It
means all races can be ﬁxed with cost k.
However, the solution may not have the lowest cost. Therefore, ARROW repeatedly
queries the solver with different cost assertions starting from 1. It stops when the constraints
are SAT with the minimum cost.
We want to point out that the race repair scheme can be made independent from the
race detection component and integrated with different race detectors.
Example. The example in Figure 4.5(a) does not have any reversible edges. We get the
repair constraint after removing the assertion Crepair = 0 from the race detection constraint.
And the solver reports N3 ! N4 as the repair, which is shown in Figure 4.6(a).

For the example in Figure 4.5(b), after removing the reversible edges, we have more

pairs of nodes that do not have edges between them. We encode the cost to introduce extra
edges between these nodes. The solver reports four repair edges as shown in 4.6(b).
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4.3.4

Page Transformation

In this step, we realize a repair by page transformation.
For each source ﬁle involved, we put back the reversible edges that do not involve any
nodes in the generated repair edges and do not form any cycles with other edges in the
graph. Recall reversible edges were removed during patch generation. We then perform a
topological sort on the part of the resulting causal graph (with repair edges and restored reversible edges) corresponding to the ﬁle. The page elements denoted by the nodes are rearranged based on the order. Since the order between DOM elements remains the same (due
to the irreversible edges), the new arrangement will not change relative positions among
DOM elements so that the page’s visual representation remains intact. Furthermore, the
restored reversible edges also ensure the reordering is minimal for safety insurance (Section 4.3.6). After this, we satisfy the repair edges denoting element reordering.
However, there are still edges that cannot be satisﬁed by reordering, such as those across
ﬁle boundaries and those involving asynchronous nodes. These edges have a high repair
cost as discussed earlier. For these edges, ARROW introduces synchronizations as follows:
it ﬁrst introduces and sets a ﬂag at the exit(s) of the head node. Then, before the tail node,
ARROW inserts code to check whether the ﬂag is set. If not, the inserted code reschedules
the tail node to execute later using the timer function setTimeout(). An example of such
transformation can be found in the second example in Section 4.2. Due to space limitations,
we omit the page transformation algorithm.
Example. Let’s revisit the two illustrative examples. Figure 4.6 shows the repairs generated by the solver. For the ﬁrst example in Figure 4.6(a), three ﬁles are involved. After
the per-ﬁle topological sort, we have {N1 , N2 }, {N3 } and {N4 }, which do not trigger any
reordering. To respect the repair edge N3 ! N4 , ARROW introduces synchronization as

shown in Figure 4.1(c). Note that both N3 and N4 are asynchronous nodes because they are
included in <iframe>’s so that we cannot determine their order from their script locations.
For the second example in Figure 4.6(b), the topological sort produces {N12 , N11 , N13 ,

N14 , N15 }. The transformed page starts with N12 , followed by N11 , N13 and N14 , which
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denote event handler registration. Such a pattern is commonly seen and ARROW has a
special rule to handle it. The rule groups the chain N11 , N13 and N14 into a handler registration inside the DOM tag as shown in Figure 4.2. The updated topological order becomes
{N12 , (N11 , N13 , N14 ), N15 }. Instead of introducing expensive synchronization, the repair
edges can be respected by reordering with the updated order. The repaired version is shown

in Figure 4.2 (c).

4.3.5

Handling Practical Issues

Searching for a cost-effective repair for real world pages is expensive. Assume there are
n nodes in the graph. ARROW needs to select k edges from 2n2 possible node pairs. The
2

complexity is hence O(22n ). To improve scalability, we apply the following optimizations.

Causal Graph Simpliﬁcation
Real world web pages commonly have a large number of DOM elements. For example,
the page shell.com has 728 DOM elements. The causal graph is large if we use one node to
denote each element. Fortunately, we can frequently model multiple elements as one node.
As mentioned before, DOM elements in a web page (excluding those included by an
iframe) are processed sequentially. A sequence of consecutive DOM elements with no
script, event handler or iframe elements in between can be represented as one single node
as there must not be any edges going in or out from inside the sequence. For example, the
following is a piece of HTML script from shell.com.
<ul id=“country selector list”>
<li><a href=“http://www.shell.com/...”>Algeria</a></li>
...
<li><a href=“http://www.shell.com.vn/”>Vietnam</a></li>
</ul>

This is a drop-down list with 197 elements. None of them has an event handler. So, we
use one node to model them. In our experience, most DOM elements do not have event
handlers such that we can greatly reduce the number of nodes.
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Constraint Simpliﬁcation
Besides reducing the graph size, we also simplify the constraint encoding. It is very
expensive to reason about quantiﬁers [112] in general. As an optimization, we eliminate
quantiﬁers by transformation. For example, we eliminate the existential quantiﬁer in theorem [2] in Section 4.3.3 by enumerating all the possible n3 in [2], as shown in the following.
8nx , ny 2 N, nx

ny := nx B ny | nx
|... | nx

n1 ^ n1 B ny

ni ^ ni B ny

[20 ]

Universal quantiﬁers are similarly removed by enumerating all nodes.

4.3.6

Safety and Limitations

Safety In Repair. We assume the def-use analysis is complete in the absence of eval()
and self-modifying JS code, which can be achieved in theory [111]. With this assumption,
ARROW is safe during repair: given a set of races in a page, it either determines that the
page is not ﬁxable or it guarantees that a repair must not introduce any new problems, such
as deadlocks or new exceptions.
First, our causal graph construction is conservative. For places that cannot be analyzed
appropriately, such as eval(), ARROW conservatively introduces causal edges that prevent
any transformation across these places. As such, the def-use information related to eval()
is not necessary for ARROW. Second, theorem [3] in Section 4.3.3 about the irreﬂexive
property of the happensBefore relation dictates that the causal graph is always cycle-free.
Together with the conservative nature of the graph, a repaired page must be deadlock free.
ARROW considers a page not ﬁxable if cycles cannot be avoided. Third, according to our
assumption, the def-use analysis is complete when eval() and self-modifying JS code are
not considered. This ensures that the generated transformation must respect these def-use
pairs such that new exceptions (e.g., undeﬁned variables) cannot be introduced.
However, our current implementation is not complete due to the incomplete modeling
of third party JS libraries. Real world pages make intensive use of third party JS libraries.

92
Due to the sheer number of these libraries, we only model a subset that is commonly used
(e.g. some JQuery functions). Note that it is usually not an option to analyze these libraries
as part of the code base because many of them are fairly complex or even obfuscated. In
practice, our limited modeling is sufﬁcient. As shown in Section 4.4, most repair transformations are fairly local, not involving substantial global code re-ordering. As a result, they
do not involve any complex library calls that may endanger safety.
Self-modifying pages are beyond the scope of ARROW. We assume the developer will
collect the set of possible pages and analyze them individually.
Limitations In Race Detection. ARROW may have false negatives and false positives in
race detection due to the dynamic features of pages and the approximations made during
analysis. For example, ARROW will miss races involving eval(). Our def-use analysis
involves over-approximations. Thus, ARROW may have false positives in race detection.
To mitigate the problem, we only assert must-aliased def-use pairs in race detection. In our
experiment, this strategy is effective. We did not observe any false positives. Another point
we want to make is that false positives are not that problematic for ARROW as they only
lead to redundant synchronizations or unnecessary reorderings.

4.4

Evaluation
ARROW is implemented in JavaScript, leveraging a set of Node.js utilities. For each

subject web page, ARROW parses it and acquires its DOM tree using htmlparser2. For
script elements, ARROW uses ECMAScript parser Esprima to parse them and generate
AST trees. With the DOM tree and JS ASTs, the causal graph can be constructed. Our
def-use analysis extends that in WALA [111]. The graph is then simpliﬁed and encoded
to constraints, together with the def-use pairs. We use Z3 [113] to solve the constraints
and ﬁnd the optimal repair if any. Then we transform the input web page using AST
transformation.
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Table 4.1.: Program characteristics and analysis result.
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We randomly select 20 web sites from the Alexa Top 500 Sites and the Fortune 500
2014 Sites as the benchmark. As our current implementation only supports a set of third
party libraries, we avoid those that make use a lot of other libraries. Table 4.1 shows the
program size of the subject web sites. As we model the parsing of each HTML tag on the
main page as a single node in our causal graph, we believe the line of code of the main
page is an important metric that reﬂects the graph size. We also report the number and the
line of code of all the JS ﬁles externally loaded by each site. Observe most of these pages
are quite complex.
Columns node and node(simp) in Table 4.1 show the number of nodes in causal graph
before and after simpliﬁcation, respectively. The size ranges from small, with United
Continental Holdings, Inc. at only 91 nodes, to quite large with Delta Air Lines,
inc. at 1840 nodes. Observe that our simpliﬁcation is effective. The reduction is usually
two orders of magnitude, which is critical to efﬁciency.
Column def-use in Table 4.1 reports the def-use pairs between graph nodes caused
by global variables/objects, when only must-aliasing is considered. These are the edges
we assert to the causal graph to detect inconsistencies. Since most of the def-use pairs are
respected by the causal graph, the number of races detected (column races) is much smaller.
We have validated that all races are real by inserting intentional sleep to the page to
trigger the problematic orders. Note that we do not have false positives because our causal
graph construction is conservative and we only consider must-aliased def-use pairs in race
detection. False negatives cannot be studied due to the lack of ground truth. As in most
existing works on bug repairs, we do not claim that ARROW can repair all races in a page.
ARROW ﬁxes races in the same page all together. Columns solving time, sync edge
and reorder egde show the constraint solving time, the number of places where customized
synchronizations are added, and the number of reordering edges in the repair. In some
cases, the number of transformations is smaller than the number of races, suggesting that
one transformation may ﬁx multiple races. There are also cases where the number of
reordering is larger than the number of races because reordering one node may cause other
nodes to be reordered to respect existing def-use constraints. We have manually validated
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(using the aforementioned intentional sleep method) that the races are correctly ﬁxed. We
have also applied EventRacer [114], which is a dynamic race detector, to the pages. For
the races that were detected by EventRacer before repair2 , they are no longer reported after
repair. Note that for 360.cn and fc2.com, ARROW failed to ﬁx some of the races (as
shown in column races) because the def-use edges and the irreversible edges form cycles.
Columns before and after report the average page load time before and after repair. We
test the constraint solving time, and the page load time on a 1.3 GHz Intel Core i5 Mac
machine with 4GB memory. The page load time is the average of 10 test runs recorded for
each site on a clean Chrome (36.0.1985) browser. Observe that the runtime overhead of the
repairs is small for most cases. In some cases, the repairs actually speed-up the load time.
Further inspection seems to indicate that reordering may speed-up page loading.
The two columns of Between Reorderings show the lines of JS code that are reordered
together with their percentage in the entire page, and the number of library function calls
involved. This is to show that in practice, the reordering is mainly local and rarely involves
library calls such that the repair is safe (i.e., no violations of def-use pairs from the original
page due to incomplete modeling of library functions). We also want to point out that
reordering may not be needed even though there are reorder edges from the solver (column
reorder edge). These edges are likely to ensure def-use pairs caused by reversible edges.
Since we put back the reversible edges before transformation, the reorder edges may not
trigger any reordering.
Table 4.1 further classiﬁes the races ARROW ﬁxed into four categories. Asynchronous
script execution: a race is caused by executing an asynchronous script where a read from or
write to an object occurs. This execution is asynchronous to other parts of the program. Out
of the 20 sites, 5 sites do not show races in this category. Late event handler registration:
a DOM tag event handler is registered late in the program. In this case, it is possible the
event ﬁres before its handler is registered. Timing events: JS programs use setTimeout()
or setInterval() to execute a function at speciﬁed time-intervals. During this time-interval,
it is possible those variables referenced by the callback function are also read/written by
2 Since

EventRacer is dynamic, it may not detect all the races reported by ARROW.
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<!-- CHS Inc. Home.html -->
01 <form name="LoginPortletForm“ action=“…">
02 <input type="text" onkeypress=“returnexecuteViaEnter(event);">
03<input type="password" onkeypress="returnexecuteViaEnter(event);">
04 <div style="color:#ff0000;display:none;”>*InvalidLogin</div>
05<input type="submit" value="LogͲin" onclick="doLogin();">
</form>
…
06<script src="main.js"></script>

Figure 4.7.: Code snippet from site www.chsinc.com.

other parts of the program. AJAX: before an AJAX request is sent out, a JS function is
registered as its response handler and will be invoked once the server response arrives.
Since the response may come at any time, this handler can interleave with other JavaScript
executions.

4.4.1

Case Study I

In this case we study three races ARROW ﬁxed in page CHS Inc.

Home.html. Part

of the page is shown in Figure 4.7. DOM tags are simpliﬁed to contain only relevant
attributes. This piece of script denotes a login form containing two text-boxes and one
submit button. The textboxes register executeViaEnter() as the onkeypress event handler.
The button registers doLogin() as the onclick handler.
Functions executeViaEnter() and doLogin() are deﬁned in the external script main.js
(Figure 4.8), which is loaded after the login form is created (line 6 in Figure 4.7). Function
executeViaEnter() calls doLogin() if the input is ‘enter’. DoLogin() ﬁrst performs some
preprocessing, e.g., reads username, before it calls the submit() method on the login form.
The server script speciﬁed in the action attribute of the login form (line 1 in Figure 4.7)
is used to process client side input. If a user enters the correct username and password, the
user proﬁle page will be displayed.
Script main.js is parsed after the creation of the login form, so it is possible these events
ﬁre before events’ registration. We tested the effect of one of the races by intentionally delaying the execution of main.js to enforce that the onclick event happens before the deﬁni-
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<!-- main.js -->
window.doLogin =function doLogin(){
// preprocessing
document.LoginPortletForm.submit();
}
window.executeViaEnter =function executeViaEnter(evt){
var charCode =…;
if (charCode ==13 ||charCode ==3)return doLogin();
returntrue;
}

Figure 4.8.: Event handlers deﬁned in main.js.

Figure 4.9.: Causal graph.

tion of doLogin(). We found that even if the user enters the correct username and password,
she will still be redirected to an error page (by the server side script).
The causal graph for this example is shown in Figure 4.9. The def-use edges, N9 ! N8,

N9 ! N5, and N9 ! N3, are not respected by the graph. For this case, the solver ﬁnds a
single edge N9 ! N1 to ﬁx all the three races. Note that the edge N7 ! N9 is reversible

so that there is no cycle in the repair graph. ARROW then reorders the script main.js and
puts it before the creation of the login form.
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(a) Default Search Box

(b) Text Overlapped with Background Image

Figure 4.10.: UI problem in www.metlimos.com.

<!ͲͲ brand ͲͲ>
01 var b=function(){if (q.value =='')q.style.background ='#FFFFFF
url(http:\...\x2Fgoogle_custom_search_watermark.gif)’;};
02var f=function(){q.style.background ='#ffffff’;};
03q.onfocus =f;
04q.onblur =b;

Figure 4.11.: Event handlers registration in brand(.js).

4.4.2

Case Study II

At the bottom of the page www.metlimos.com, there is a search bar composed of a
text box and a search button, which allows the user to perform google search within the
site. The background of this text box is a google custom search watermark image in gif
format by default (see Figure 4.10(a)). When user clicks the text box, the background
should be set to be empty. When the text box loses focus, the background sets back to
the default watermark image. Figure 4.11 gives the code snippet of the onfocus and onblur
events registration for the text box. These events are registered through an external script
brand(.js) which is parsed after the creation of the search box. Before the external script
is fetched, the onfocus and onblur events are not registered. At this point, if the user sets
focus in the search box and types some text, the input text will be overlapped with the
default watermark image as shown in Figure 4.10(b).
The ﬁxing of this case is similar to that of the motivating example in Figure 4.6(b). The
solver reports three repair edges. One edge from the textbox to the brand(.js) respects the
def-use of the textbox. The other two edges start from the onblur and onfocus handler deﬁnitions and end at the calling of each event handler respectively. In order to implement the
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repair edges, ARROW reordered the handlers’ registration at the point of textbox creation
and also placed the handler deﬁnitions before the textbox.

4.5

Related Work
Our work is closely related to client-side race detection of web applications [4,105,114,

115]. Zheng et al. [105] applied static analysis on JS code to detect atomicity violations
caused by asynchrony in Ajax. WebRacer [4] is a dynamic race detector that leverages the
happens-before relations between common web features to identify races. Its follow-up
work EventRacer [114] proposed the concept of race coverage and reduced false warnings
caused by ad-hoc synchronizations present in web pages. However, none of these works
discusses how to automatically repair races, which is challenging for the following reasons:
(1) there is no native support for synchronization in JS so that the concurrency control to ﬁx
a race may have to be developed from scratch; (2) adding synchronizations may introduce
new bugs such as deadlocks or exceptions if not done properly; (3) one page may have
multiple races, their repairs may interfere with each other (e.g. the repair of one race may
also ﬁx another race or the repairs of multiple races may cause deadlocks).
Our work is relevant to program synthesis and program repair. Le Goues et al. [116]
apply heuristics based genetic programming to repair C programs. SearchRepair [117]
generates patches based on semantic code search over large repositories of candidate code.
DirectFix [118] considers semantic factors and generates the simplest program repairs for
C programs. LeakFix [119] automatically ﬁxes memory leaks in C program via static
analysis. SemFix [120] generates patches using semantic program analysis via dynamic
symbolic execution. Program transformations have also been successfully applied to ﬁxing
concurrency issues in traditional multi-threaded programs. Jin et al. [121, 122] presented
a system that can detect and repair several kinds of concurrency bugs by adding orders.
Raychev et al. [123] introduced a framework that transforms a non-deterministic parallel
program into a deterministic one by introducing synchronizations.
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Our work is also related to automatic web application repair. Selakovic and Pradel
[124] proposed a pattern-based detection and repair method for performance problems in
JavaScript programs. Nguyen et al. [125] and Samimi et al. [126] proposed an automatic
technique to ﬁx HTML generation errors in PHP scripts. Alkhalaf et al. [127] presented an
automatic differential repair for vulnerable input sanitizers. Our work is related to preventions of concurrency related violations in general [128–130]. ConcBugAssist [130] aims to
ﬁx assertion violations by enforcing extra schedule orders. It encodes the detection of violating schedule as a Max-SAT problem and computes ﬁxes by reducing it to a set covering
problem. Besides introducing extra schedule orders as ﬁxes, ARROW could additionally
reorder the code to avoid synchronization overheads. However, ConcBugAssist relies on
the observed dynamic executions. The ﬁxes may introduce violations for unobserved executions. Comparatively, ARROW doesn’t introduce new races, as it considers all def-uses
via static analysis.
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5

CONCLUSION

This dissertation focuses on developing novel techniques to prevent malicious advetising,
defense against undesirable ad blocking, and automatically ﬁx web concurrency bugs. We
ﬁrst develop a novel programming support system, PAD, which effectively suppresses a
large set of malvertising cases. We then build a practical system, WebRanz, for circumventing the state-of-the-art ad blockers on a large number of popular websites while retaining the faithful appearances and functionalities of these websites. In addition, we introduce
an innovative scheme that leverages constraint-solving to safely ﬁx concurrency bugs on
real-world commercial websites.
Advertisements are malicious. As a top security threat that continues to develop, malvertising keeps slipping through the cracks because none of the stakeholders involved in advertising (i.e., advertisers, publishers, and ad networks) is picking up the slack. Among the
various parties involved, advertisers have no interest in protecting publishers’ legitimate
rights. Though ad networks strive to suppress malicious ads with pattern-based gatekeeping, they are limited to attacks with known tactics. We consider publishers to be the ideal
party to protect themselves from malicious ads. To do so, We have proposed a novel programming support system, called PAD, that allows publishers to program their protection
logic of secure advertising. Due to the unique virtualized execution model of web browsers,
cybercriminals have to inject malicious payloads via JavaScript interfaces that can manipulate consecutive memory regions. To corrupt malicious payloads and thus neutralize
attacks, PAD randomizes values in memory. In particular, PAD encodes values written to
memory and decodes them upon retrieval using the same key employed in encoding. In this
way, malicious payloads are encoded before being injected into memory. Since malicious
payloads are always executed natively, without going through the JavaScript interfaces,
malicious payloads are not properly decoded before execution and hence broken. In contrast, benign data used inside JavaScript is decoded properly as it has to go through the
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JavaScript interfaces. PAD also provides a novel persistent runtime, which can self-install
in each delegation layer and ensures persistent protection throughout the entire life-cycle
of ad delivery. With a negligible runtime overhead (1.67%) on 200 Alexa websites, PAD
effectively prevented a large set of real incidents of malvertising attacks.
Advertisements are undesirably blocked. With the rise of ad blocking software, adsupported Internet services would eventually vanish. To maintain a sustainable web ecosystem, We developed a novel, lightweight web page randomization technique, called WebRanz, that circumvents ad blocking by randomizing web content (including HTML, CSS,
and JavaScript). Particularly, WebRanz randomizes page elements’ signatures such as
URL, id, and classname to invalidate the predeﬁned patterns that ad blockers use to ﬁlter out
ads, and de-randomizes elements when they are accessed through interface functions. To
ensure page appearances and legitimate functionalities are intact, WebRanz was designed
to preserve the dependencies between DOM objects and CSS selectors, between DOM elements and JavaScript, and to be able to handle dynamically generated elements as well as
resolve randomized URLs. WebRanz effectively prevents ad blockers from blocking ads
on 221 Alexa top web pages. It has a negligible runtime overhead (1.38%) which does
not downgrade user experience. Finally, WebRanz also beneﬁts the defense against web
bots that rely on predeﬁned patterns to locate DOM elements. Our experiments showed
that WebRanz successfully prevented representative web bots targeted at popular websites
including Amazon, Groupon, Twitter, and Yelp.
Web Concurrency Bugs. Prior to my work on protecting the web advertising ecosystem, I
worked on the automatic repair of web concurrency bugs which can cause permanent data
corruptions, privilege escalations, and usability issues. For example, web application races
on a cloud service page cause users’ ﬁles to be undesirably deleted from the server. We
have developed ARROW, the ﬁrst technique that can automatically ﬁx race conditions on
client side pages based on static analysis. In particular, ARROW statically models a web
page as a causal graph denoting happens-before relations between elements. ARROW then
detects races by identifying inconsistencies between the graph and the dependence relations
intended by the developer. To ensure consistencies, ARROW leverages a constraint solver
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to compute additional happens-before edges. The page is then transformed to ensure the
new happens-before relation by re-ordering the elements in the page or adding customized
synchronizations to respect the repair edges. ARROW effectively ﬁxed 151 races from 20
real-world commercial websites.
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